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SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE DEPARTURES:
THREAT TO SENTENCING GOALS OR
NECESSARY EVIL?
LISA EGITTO"
The United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) were
promulgated by the United States Sentencing Commission
(Commission), which was created by Congressl for the purpose of
establishing a uniform federal sentencing system.2 The goals of
this new federal sentencing system were to eliminate disparity in
sentencing, 3 to increase honesty in sentencing4 and to create
' Candidate for Juris Doctorate 2003, St. John's University, B.S. Criminal Justice, St.
John's University 2000.
1 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, app. § 2 (2001) (stating that
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 provides for development of the Guidelines and
delegates broad authority to the Commission); see also Bryan S. Gowdy, Leniency Bribes.
Justifying the Federal Practice of Offering Leniency for Testimony, 60 LA. L. REV. 447,
458 (2000) (noting that United States Sentencing Commission was created by
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984); Maria Limbert, Problems Associated with
Prosecutorial Control Over Filing Substantial Assistance Motions and a Proposal for a
Substantial Assistance Pro-Sentence Hearing, 27 J. LEGIS. 251, 252-53 (2001) (discussing
how Commission was created by Sentencing Reform Act of 1984); Hon. Bruce M. Selya &
John C. Massaro, The Illustrative Role Of Substantial Assistance Departures in
Combating Ultra - Uniformity, 35 B.C. L. REV. 799, 801 (1994) (stating Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 created the United States Sentencing Commission).
2 See Gowdy, supra note 1, at 458 (stating that goal of United States Sentencing
Commission was to establish uniform sentencing standards); see also Philip T. Masterson,
Eliminating the Government Motion Requirement of Section 5K1.1 of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines-a Substantial Response to Substantial Assistance: United States
v. Gutierrez, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 929, 952 (1991) (proposing that "one of the main
purposes behind the implementation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was greater
uniformity in sentencing"); Daniel W. Stiller, Section 5K1.1 Requires the Commission's
Substantial Assistance, 12 FED. SENT. REP. 107, 108 (Sept./Oct. 1999) (noting that
Guidelines were intended to promote uniformity).
3 See Oversight of the US Sentencing Commission: Hearing of the Senate Judiciary
Comm., Subcomm. On Criminal Justice Oversight (2000) [hereinafter Hearings]
(testimony of Sen. Thurmond) (stating that elimination of sentence disparity between
similarly situated defendants was primary purpose of Guidelines); see also Jane L. Froyd,
Safety Valve Failure: Low-Level Drug Offenders and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
94 Nw. U.L. REV. 1471, 1475-76 (2000) (discussing Congress's primary goal of eliminating
sentencing disparity); Selya & Massaro, supra note 1, at 801 (noting that Congress sought
reasonable uniformity in sentencing).
4 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, app. § 3 (2001) (discussing
how Congress sought to ensure that sentences reflect actual time served); see also Froyd,
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sentences that were proportionate to the crimes committed.5 The
Guidelines established a system of sentencing, whereby a
number of factors are evaluated to determine the appropriate
guideline range.6 These factors, the offense level and the
defendant's criminal history, are girded against one another to
determine the guideline range, which is expressed in a period of
months. 7  In calculating the guideline range, upward or
downward adjustments may be made for a variety of reasons.8
Once the guideline range has been determined, the defendant is
sentenced within that range9 unless a basis for departure
exists10 There are several different bases for departures under
supra note 3, at 1476 (noting Congress sought to achieve honesty and certainty in
sentencing, whereby defendants would serve the amount of time they were sentenced);
Limbert, supra note 1, at 252 (discussing that one goal of Guidelines was to ensure the
sentence was similar to the actual time served).
5 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch.1, pt. A, app. § 3 (2001) (stating that
Commission took culpability into account in creating Guidelines); see also Froyd, supra
note 3, at 1476-77 (acknowledging Congress sought to make sentences reflect culpability);
Selya & Massaro, supra note 1, at 801 (discussing proportionality as a goal of the
Guidelines).
6 Guideline ranges are determined by considerations of a defendant's criminal history
and the type of offense committed. The offense level is calculated in accordance with
Chapter Two of the Guidelines and the defendant's criminal history is determined by
Chapter Four of the Guidelines. See Froyd, supra note 3 at 1480; see also Gowdy, supra
note 1, at 458; Selya & Massaro, supra note 1, at 801-04.
7 See Adriano Hrvatin, Comment, Unconstitutional Exploitation of Delegated
Authority: How to Deter Prosecutors from Using 'Substantial Assistance" to Defeat the
Intent of Federal Sentencing Laws, 32 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 117, 133-34 (2002)
(explaining how the Guidelines determine a range of sentences expressed in a period of
months); Eva E. Subotnik, Note, Past Violence, Future Danger? Rethinking Diminished
Capacity Departures under Federal Sentencing Guidelines Section 5K2.13, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 1340, 1340 (2002) (illustrating the process of determining the sentencing range);
see also Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks
is Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1869 n. 17 (2000)
(describing factors that are used at arriving at a guideline range).
8 Adjustments are available for a variety of non-offense specific reasons, such as
whether the defendant was a minor or major participant, whether there was a hate crime
motivation, or whether a special skill was involved in the commission of the crime. See
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDEINES MANUAL §§ 3A1.1, 3B1.1-3. The most well known
adjustment is the obstruction of justice enhancement. For a further discussion of
enhancements for obstruction of justice, see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
3C1.1. See generally Stepherk Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1988) (explaining how
the adjustment process works).
9 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, app. § 2 (2001) (instructing
that once guideline range has been determined, defendant should be sentenced within
that range); see also Hearings, supra note 3, at 1 (testimony of Sen. Thurmond) (noting
that Guidelines provide for range of possible sentences); Froyd, supra note 3, at 1481
(stating a defendant must be sentenced within appropriate Guideline range).
10 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, app. § 4(b) (2001).
Departures from the guideline range may be upward, thus increasing the sentence, or
downward, thus decreasing the sentence. See Froyd, supra note 3, at 1481. See generally
Limbert, supra note 1, at 253 (discussing availability of departures under Guidelines).
SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE DEPARTURES
the Guidelines. I I
This note will focus on the substantial assistance departure,
which provides for a sentence below the guideline range if the
defendant provides substantial assistance to the government.12
Part I of this note will discuss the requirements and operation of
substantial assistance departures. Part II will examine whether
the use of substantial assistance departures are inconsistent
with traditional sentencing goals and the objectives of the
Guidelines. Part III will discuss the benefits to the use of
substantial assistance departures. Part IV will examine whether
the benefits to the use of substantial assistance departures
outweigh the threats these departures have on traditional
sentencing goals and the intended objectives of the Guidelines.
Part V will discuss possible measures that may be taken to
reduce the negative effects of substantial assistance departures.
OPERATION OF SECTION 5K1.1
Section 5K1. 1 of the Guidelines allows the court to depart from
the guideline range if the government makes a motion showing
that the defendant provided substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person who has
committed an offense.13 Courts have generally interpreted the
government motion requirement strictly, requiring federal
II Upward departures may be granted where the victim suffered death or some type
of injury. See U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.1-2.3 (2001). Downward
departures are available on the grounds of coercion, diminished capacity, or voluntary
disclosure, but the criteria necessary to invoke these provisions is nearly impossible to
establish. See, e.g. U. S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§§ 5K2.12, 5K2.13, 5K2.16
(2001) (discussing circumstances that warrant departure). See generally Albert W.
Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agreements Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 117 FED.
R. DECS. 459, 460-69 (1988) (reviewing possible bases for departures).
12 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5K1.1 (2001) (defining substantial
assistance departures); see also Froyd, supra note 3, at 1483 (discussing definition of
substantial assistance departures); Jason C. Moreau, Leniency for Testimony: Hipocrisy
or Judicial Necessity, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 169, 170-71 (2000) (stating that
section 5K1. 1 allows for departures based on substantial assistance).
13 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5K1.1 (2001) (noting requirements
for substantial assistance departure, specifically the government motion requirement and
the requirement that defendant provide substantial assistance in prosecution or
investigation of another); Andrew M. Levine, The Confounding Boundaries of "Apprendi-
Land": Statutory Minimums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L.
377, 430-31 (2002) (stating that § 5K1.1 provides that once the government motion stated
that "the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from
the guidelines"); Hrvatin, supra note 7, at 144 (discussing the requirement of the
government's motion before court may depart from the sentencing range).
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prosecutors to make a motion under Section 5K1.1 before
granting a substantial assistance departure. 14 District courts
may review a prosecutor's decision not to file a motion for a
substantial assistance departure,15 however these instances are
limited, 16 and courts generally require some threshold showing
before holding a hearing on the matter. 17 Commentators have
criticized the motion requirement for granting prosecutors too
much discretion in deciding whether a substantial assistance
departure is warranted in a specific instance.18  Some
commentators believe giving federal prosecutors the discretion to
decide whether a substantial assistance departure is warranted
is a mistake because the prosecutors' decisions will not be subject
to appellate review, and the prosecutor is less equipped to make
14 See e.g., United States v. Cruz-Guerrero, 194 F.3d 1029, 1031-32 (91h Cir. 1999)
(holding that United States v. Koon did not eliminate government motion requirement for
substantial assistance departures); United States v. Shrewsberry, 980 F.2d 1296, 1297
(9th Cir. 1992) (holding defendants are not entitled to substantial assistance departures
absent a government motion); United States v. Lewis, 896 F.2d 246, 247 (2d Cir. 1990)
(holding that sentencing courts cannot depart under § 5K1. 1 unless a government motion
is filed).
15 See Selya & Massaro, supra note 1, at 813 (discussing courts' ability to review
prosecutorial decision not to file motion for substantial assistance departure); see also
Elkan Abramowitz, Prosecutorial Input On Downward Departures For Assistance, N.Y. L.
J., Jan. 5, 1999, p. 3, col. 1 (listing procedures to review prosecutor's decision not to file in
Second Circuit); Limbert, supra note 1, at 260-61 (stating prosecutor's decision not to file
substantial assistance motion may be reviewed if refusal to file had unconstitutional
motive).
16 See United States v. Wade, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992) (holding federal district courts
may only review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial assistance motion if they find
refusal to be based on unconstitutional motive); United States v. Bagnoli, 7 F.3d 90, 92
(6th Cir. 1993) (stating defendant's right to a hearing based on a substantial assistance
motion is conditioned on a showing of an unconstitutional motive); Selya & Massaro,
supra note 1, at 814 (noting court may review prosecutor's decision not to file motion only
when there is constitutionally impermissible motive).
17 See Wade, 504 U.S. at 185 (stating defendant must make a threshold showing of
prosecutor's improper motive before district court may inquire into reasons behind
prosecutor's failure to file motion); see also United States v. Johnson, 973 F.2d 611 (8th
Cir. 1992) (holding district court was not required to inquire into reasons for prosecutor's
refusal to file motion for downward departure when defendant made no threshold
showing of government's improper motive); Limbert, supra note 1, at 261 (noting Wade
Court found a threshold showing was required before a review of prosecutor's refusal to
file could be made); Selya & Massaro, supra note 1, at 814 (finding courts require a
threshold showing before concluding discovery or an evidentiary hearing is appropriate).
18 See Abramowitz, supra note 15, at p. 3, col. 1 (noting prosecutors in the Southern
and Eastern Districts of New York specify in their cooperation agreements that the
decision to file a 5Ki. 1 motion is entirely in their discretion); see also Marcia Chambers,
Prosecutors Take Charge of Sentences; Feds Hold Sway Over Disparity, NAT'L L. J., Nov.
26, 1990, p.13, col. 1 (stating prosecutors have sole discretion in deciding whether
substantial assistance departures are warranted); Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market
for Snitches, 47 BUFFALO L. REV. 563, 598 (1999) (arguing "substantial assistance
departures have emerged as one of the favorite ways to exercise prosecutorial power").
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the determination than a federal judge would be.19
Section 5K1.1 also requires the defendant to provide
substantial assistance to the government. 20  Section 5K1.1
provides little guidance in defining substantial assistance and
determining the extent of the departure to be granted by listing
several factors for the court to consider in evaluating the
assistance provided by the defendant.2' More specifically these
factors include: the significance and usefulness of the assistance
provided;22 the government's evaluation of the assistance; 23 the
truthfulness, completeness and reliability of any information or
testimony provided; 24 the nature and extent of the assistance; 25
any injury suffered, or any risk of injury to the defendant or his
family as a result of the assistance;26 and the timeliness of the
19 See Christopher Mascharka, Mandatory Minimum Sentences: Exemplifying the
Law of Unintended Consequences, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 935, 943 (2001) (criticizing
Guidelines for taking discretion away from judges and placing it in prosecutor's hands);
see also Chambers, supra note 18, at 13, col. 1 (stating defense attorneys have criticized
Guidelines for transferring discretion from judges, whose qualifications have been
approved by the United States Senate, to federal prosecutors); Limbert, supra note 1, at
257- 58 (describing prosecutors as biased advocates).
20 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5K1.1 (2001) (stating requirement
that defendant provided substantial assistance in the investigation of another); see also
Limbert, supra note 1, at 255 (finding substantial assistance must be provided in
investigation of another to qualify for substantial assistance departure); Moreau, supra
note 12, at 170-71 (noting section 5K1.1 allows for a departure when information useful to
prosecution or investigation of another is obtained from defendant).
21 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5K1.1 (a)(1)-(5) (2001) (listing
factors); see also Melendez v. U.S., 518 U.S. 120, 129 (1996) (stating district courts must
consider factors in Section 5K1.1 (a)(1)-(5) in determining extent of departure below
statutory minimum); United States v. Alegria, 192 F.3d. 179, 183 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting
Section 5K1.1 (a)(1)-(5) suggests five non-exclusive factors that courts should consider).
22 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5K1.1 (a)(1) (2001); see also Alegria,
192 F.3d. at 183 (noting Section 5K1.1 (a)(1) discusses "the significance and utility of the
information provided"); United States v. Chotas, 968 F.3d. 1193, 1195 (11th Cir. 1992)
(finding Section 5K1.1(a)(1) measures "the 'significance' and 'value' of the defendant's
assistance").
23 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5K1.1 (a)(1) (2001); see also United
States v. Senn, 102 F.3d. 327, 329 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding under Section 5K1.1(a)(1)
courts may "take into consideration the government's evaluation of the assistance
rendered"); United States v. Winters, 117 F.3d. 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting same).
24 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5Kl.1 (a)(2) (2001); see also Alegria,
192 F.3d. at 183 (finding "full, complete and truthful cooperation" corresponds to Section
5Kl.l(a)(2)); United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d. 980, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting Section
5K1. 1(a)(2) provides "the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or
testimony provided by the defendant" be considered when determining the extent of the
departure).
25 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5K1.1 (a)(3) (2001); see also Alegria,
192 F.3d. at 183 (citing Section 5K1.1 (a)(3) examining "the nature and extent of the
defendant's assistance"); United States v. Chotas, 968 F.3d. 1193, 1195 (11th Cir. 1992)
(noting Section 5K1.1 (a)(3) contemplates "nature and extent of the defendants
assistance").
26 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5Kl.1 (a)(4) (2001); see also United
2003]
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assistance. 27 Additionally a defendant's assistance must have
been rendered in a "prosecution or investigation of another."28
There are no other uniform considerations in place to aid judges
and federal prosecutors in the determination of whether a
defendant's assistance is substantial enough to warrant a
departure from the Guideline range or the determination of the
extent of the departure warranted.
Once the government makes a motion for a substantial
assistance departure, the sentencing judge must evaluate the
assistance provided in order to determine if such a departure is
warranted.29 If it is decided that the defendant is entitled to a
substantial assistance departure, the sentencing judge is granted
broad discretion in determining the degree of the departure.30
There has been some disagreement among the circuit courts as to
how to determine the extent of a departure,3 1 and whether
States v. Watson, 57 F.3d. 1093, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing Section 5Kl.1(a)(4)); United
States v. White, 71 F.3d 920, 928 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting commission specifically included
"any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance"
as a consideration by district court in determining the appropriate departure).
27 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5Kl.1 (a)(5) (2001); see also Alegria,
192 F.3d. at 183 (noting Section 5K1.1 (a)(5) contemplates "the timeliness of the proffer");
Senn, 102 F.3d. at 329 (writing under Section 5K1.1(a)(1) courts may take into
consideration "the timeliness of the defendant's assistance").
28 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5K1.1 (2001); see also United States
v. Berger, 251 F.3d 894, 907 (10th Cir. 2001) (commenting Section 5K1.1 provides in part
that "upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial
assistance in investigation or prosecution of another who has committed an offense");
United States v. Quach, 302 F.3d. 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that district court
may depart downward "upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has
provided substantial assistance in investigation or prosecution of another").
29 See Moreau, supra note 12, at 170-71 (noting assistance provided is evaluated by
judge, who then decides if it is substantial enough to warrant a departure); see also
Limbert, supra note 1, at 255 (stating theoretically sentencing judge has final say in
determining if substantial assistance departure is warranted); Selya & Massaro, supra
note 1, at 803 (discussing how sentencing judge makes final determination as to whether
substantial assistance departure is warranted).
30 See Selya & Massaro, supra note 1, at 825 (noting sentencing judge determines
degree of departure); see also Cynthia Lee & Brian Derdowski, Jr., The Future Of
Substantial Assistance: Recommendations For Reform, 11 FED. SENT. R. 78, 1998 WL
1038954, *7 (Vera Inst. Just.)(discussing judge's discretion in final determination to
depart and extent of departure); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Defendants: The Costs
And Benefits Of Purchasing Information From Scoundrels, 8 FED. SENT. R. 292, 1996 WL
671560, *2 n.8 (Vera Inst. Just.) (acknowledging judge's discretion once government
motion has been made).
31 See United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining the
departure must be reasonable, but is permissible because no statute could encompass all
possibilities); United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678, 684-85 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting the
calculation method used in the Second Circuit due to the limited guidance given by the
Guidelines); see also Selya & Massaro, supra note 1, at 825-30 (discussing various
possible methods of determining degree of departure).
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mandatory minimum sentences set limits on the extent of the
departure. 32 However, in Melendez v. United States,33 the United
States Supreme Court held that in order to depart below the
mandatory minimum sentence, the government must make a
separate motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). 34 18 U.S.C. §
3553(e)35 allows the government to make a motion requesting the
defendant be sentenced below the mandatory minimum sentence,
in order to reflect the defendant's substantial assistance. 36 It
should be noted that Section 5K1. 1 of the Guidelines and 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e) are both substantively and procedurally similar,
however in order for a judge to reduce a sentence below the
mandatory minimum range, the government must make an
additional motion under 18 U.S.C. §3553(e). 37
32 See United States v. Beckett, 996 F.2d 70, 74-75 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining that as
long as the government makes the appropriate 5K1.1 motion, the judge may depart
downward without restrictions on any sentencing minimums); United States v. Ah-Kai,
951 F.2d 490, 492 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that recent cases in other circuits have all held
that a 5KI. 1 motion by the government allows the judge to depart downward without any
adherence to the sentencing guidelines or minimums); see also Selya & Massaro, supra
note 1, at 830-32 (discussing conflicting views among circuits concerning whether
sentencing judges may depart below mandatory minimum sentences without separate
motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)).
33 518 U.S. 120 (1996).
34 Melendez, 518 U.S. at 125-26 (stating that Section 3553(e) "requires a
[glovernment motion requesting or authorizing the district court to 'impose a sentence
below a level established by statute as minimum sentence' before the court may impose
such a sentence."). See Frank 0. Bowman, III, Departing is Such Sweet Sorrow. A Year of
Judicial Revolt on "Substantial Assistance "Departures Follows a Decade ofProsecutoial
Indiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REV. 7, 19 (1999) (explaining the facts leading up to the
Melendez holding); see also Weinstein, supra note 18, at 573 (noting the amendment to
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act gave the judge the ability to sentence below the statutory
minimum if the government made a motion to that effect and the defendant provided
cooperation).
35 18 U.S.C. § 3553(3) provides:
Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a
sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to
reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution
of another person who has committed an offense. Such sentence shall be imposed
in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code.
36 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (stating the necessity of the government to make a motion
for a sentence imposed below the minimum); see also Selya & Massaro, supra note 1, at
830 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)); Abramowitz, supra note 15, at p. 3, col. 1 (noting
that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) requires a motion by the government before a court can depart
below the mandatory minimum).
37 See United States v. Wade, 504 U.S. 181, 184-85 (1992) (noting that 18 U.S.C. §
3553(e) and Section 5Kl.1 are both procedurally similar); see also Limbert, supra note 1,
at 254-55 (highlighting that both 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and Section 5K1.1 have the same
procedural requirements of a motion by the government for a judge to depart downward
from sentence minimum); Hrvatin, supra note 7, at 143 (describing the similarities
between 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and Section 5K1.1 and further noting that in order to depart
2003]
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Case law may illustrate the way in which substantial
assistance departures are utilized, although such opinions are
scarce. One illustrative case is United States v. Rosado,38 in
which Rosado plead guilty to conspiring with others to distribute
and possession with the intent to distribute heroin.39 The
Government recommended a downward departure based on
Rosado's substantial assistance, namely his willingness to testify
at the trial of the head of the narcotics organization he was
involved with and the information he provided to the
Government about the narcotics operation's scope and
structure.40 Rosado's Guideline range was 87-108 months, as
determined by the Presentence Report prepared by the U.S.
Probation Office. 41  Despite the applicable guideline range,
Rosado was sentenced to 10 months of imprisonment followed by
four years of supervised release because of his substantial
assistance.42  Another illustrative case is United States v.
below the Guideline range a motion under Section 5Kl.1 must be made and in order to
depart below the mandatory minimum a separate motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) must
be made).
38 United States v. Rosado, No. 98 CR 1316-05 RWS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17968
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2001).
39 See Rosado, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17968, at *1 (announcing Rosado's guilty plea to
"conspiring with otherts] to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram
and more of mixtures and substances containing... heroin"); Court Suggests Downward
Departure Because Of Defendant's Cooperation With Government; United States v.
Hector Rosado, N.Y. L. J., Nov. 23, 2001, 17 (stating Rosado plead guilty to conspiring
with others to possess and distribute heroin).
40 See Rosado, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17968, at *4 (explaining the cooperation Rosado
gave the government in exchange for a reduced sentence); Court Suggests Downward
Departure Because Of Defendant's Cooperation With Government United States v.
Hector Rosado, supra note 39, at 17 (discussing rationale for the downward departure).
See generally Wade, 504 U.S. at 182-84 (suggesting a relationship between defendants
crime and the assistance given to the government, including Wade's drug offense
convictions and the information he supplied to the government regarding another drug
dealer).
41 See Rosado, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17968, at *3 (discussing the Sentencing
Guidelines which place Rosado's conduct at a base offense level of 34); Court Suggests
Downward Departure Because Of Defendant's Cooperation With Government; United
States v. Hector Rosado, supra note 39, at 17 (noting Rosado's Guideline range as
determined by the United States Probation Office).
42 See Rosado, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17968, at *5 (clarifying that due to the
assistance Rosado supplied to the Government, he received a sentence of 10 months
imprisonment, followed by probation); Court Suggests Downward Departure Because Of
Defendant's Cooperation With Government; United States v. Hector Rosado, supra note
39, at 17 (stating Rosado received a ten month sentence due to his cooperation with the
government). See generally United States v. Ah-Kai, 951 F.2d 490, 493-94 (2d Cir. 1991)
(explaining that necessity of the government to make a motion for downward departure
based on the defendant's "substantial assistance," but once made, the extent of departure
is at the judge's discretion).
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Featherston,43 in which Featherstone admitted to various acts of
murder, counterfeiting, distribution of drugs and racketeering.
Featherstone began cooperating when he was convicted on a
murder charge. After serving five years on the murder charge,
the imposition of the sentence was suspended and Featherstone
was placed on probation for five years. 44 The suspension of the
sentence was partially based on Featherstone's cooperation with
the government that included critical testimony, recruiting
additional cooperators, and the conviction of at least seven
individuals.45
COSTS OF SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE DEPARTURES
Substantial assistance departures are criticized as being
detrimental to the criminal justice system for a variety of reasons
including: creating a coercion to inform;46 placing too much
discretion in the hands of prosecutors; 47 and establishing a
system whereby the most culpable defendants reap the most
rewards. 48 This section will explore how the practice of rewarding
defendants who cooperate does not serve the traditional goals of
43 No. 86 Cr. 861 RWS, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14732.
44 See Featherstone, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *8-9 (stating Featherstone would
receive five years probation); see also Timothy Clifford, Gang Enforcer to Testify Against
Gotti, NEWSDAY, Jan. 26, 1990 at 8 (mentioning Featherstone received probation for his
crimes); Paul Moses, Informers a Necessary Evil, NEWSDAY, Jun. 29, 1989 at 3 (noting
this occurred after Featherstone was sentenced to five years probation).
45 See Featherstone, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *5 (discussing extent of Featherstone's
cooperation); see also Marcia Chambers, It Is Not Uncommon For The Government To
Keep Informers Satisfied, NAT'L. L. J., Apr. 6, 1992, p.13, col. 1 (discussing Featherstone's
cooperation); Richard Esposito, 'I'm Outta Here' Gotti Says,- But Prosecutors Confident of
Convicting Reputed Crime Boss, NEWSDAY, Jan. 25, 1989 at 3 (observing Featherstone's
cooperation with authorities began in 1986).
46 See Chambers, supra note 18, at 13, col. 1 (arguing cooperation is only way for
many defendants to avoid mandatory minimum sentences therefore coercion to cooperate
exists); see also Stanley S. Arkin, Moral Issues And The Cooperating Witness, N.Y. L. J.,
June 9, 1994 (noting Guidelines induce defendants to cooperate with the government);
Weinstein, supra note 18, at 563-64 (1999) (stating Guidelines have created incentive for
defendants to cooperate).
47 See Chambers, supra note 18, at 13, col. 1 (stating discretion to make Section 5K1.1
motion rests with prosecutor); see also Abramowitz, supra note 15, at p. 3, col. 1 (arguing
that prosecutors have broad discretion in deciding whether to file a substantial assistance
motion); Limbert, supra note 1, at 260-61 (discussing broad discretion that rests with
prosecutors).
48 See Richman, supra note 30, at *1 (criticizing substantial assistance departures
because most culpable defendants are rewarded); see also Froyd, supra note 3, at 493
(arguing substantial assistance departures only benefit most culpable defendants);
Mascharka, supra note 19, at 943 (noting that high-level, culpable defendants are the
ones receiving substantial assistance departures).
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punishment or the goals of the Guidelines.
Traditional notions of punishment can be divided up into two
schools of thought: utilitarian and retributive.49 Utilitarian goals
of punishment include deterrence, which focuses on the ability to
deter both specific defendants and the general community.50
Deterrence theories aimed at deterring future criminal conduct of
individual defendants are referred to as specific deterrence
theories. General deterrence theories focus on making criminal
activity undesirable to society. Deterrence theories claim that by
inflicting punishments severe enough to make criminal conduct
less desirable, individuals will choose not to commit crimes.51
Deterrence theories advocate punishments that are only severe
enough to convince individuals criminal conduct is not beneficial,
and thereby inducing individuals not to engage in such conduct.52
Alternatively, retributive theories of punishment focus on a
particular defendant's culpability. Retributive theories consider
the type of offense committed and advocate punishments that are
proportional to these offenses.53 Retributive theories do not
49 See Michael A. Cokley, Whatever Happened to That Old Saying "Thou Shall Not
Kill?": A Plea for the Abolition of the Death Penalty 2 LOy. J. PUB. INT. L. 67, 74 (2001)
(describing both utilitarian and retributivist ideals); Michele Cotton, Back with a
Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal
Punishment; 37 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2000) (distinguishing utilitarian purposes
of punishment with those of the retributive school of thought); Deirdre Golash and James
P. Lynch, Public Opinion, Crime Seriousness, and Sentencing Policy, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L.
703, 708-13 (1995) (revealing differences between retributivism and utilitarianism).
5o See Cotton, supra note 49, at 1316 (describing deterrence theories of punishment);
see also Joseph S. Hall, Guided to Injustice" The Effect of the Sentencing Guidelines on
Indigent Defendants and Public Defense, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1331, 1339 (1999) (arguing
utilitarian philosophy tends to focus on deterrence of crime); John T. Parry, Culpability,
Mistake, and Official Interpretations of Law, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 31 (1997) (mentioning
utilitarian philosophy tends to focus on deterrence of potential criminal behavior).
51 See Cotton, supra note 49, at 1316 (stating deterrence theorists conclude that by
making punishment for certain conduct severe enough to scare people from engaging in
that conduct, people will be deterred from engaging in that conduct); see also U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, app. § 3 (2001) (discussing punishment
theories that urge sentences should be scaled to most effectively lessen likelihood of
future crimes); Michael Edmund O'Neil, Abraham's Legacy: An Empirical Assessment of
(Nearly) First-Time Offenders in the Federal System, 42 B.C. L. REV. 291, 298 (2001)
(explaining utilitarianism concentrates on discouraging future illegal acts).
52 See Cokley, supra note 49, at 74 (observing theory that punishment is linked to
deterrence); Cotton, supra note 49, at 1316 (noting utilitarian theories suggest using
punishment as a means to an end rather than an end itself); Louis Michael Seidman,
Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control,
94 YALE L.J. 315, 316 (1984) (outlining utilitarian principle that punishment should be
based on prevention and societal needs).
53 See Cotton, supra note 49, at 1315-16 (discussing retributive theories of
punishment); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, app. § 3 (2001)
(noting "just deserts" theories of punishment focus on offender's culpability and resulting
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attempt to deter future criminal conduct; rather the emphasis is
on punishing the past criminal behavior of the defendant.
The intended goals of the Guidelines embody some of the goals
of traditional punishment theories. Similar to retributive
theories, the Guidelines were intended to establish a system of
sentencing, where the sentences were proportionate to the
offense committed.54 Additionally, the Guidelines sought to
eliminate disparities in sentencing practices across the districts
and establish a uniform system of federal sentencing.55 It is
asserted that Section 5K1.1 does not advance any of these goals,
but rather hinders them.
Proportionality Goals
As noted above, proportionate sentencing is a goal of both
retributive theories of punishment and the Guidelines. 56
Substantial assistance departures thwart this goal by reducing
sentences for individuals who cooperate with the government
without regard to the culpability of the individual.5 7 The
Guidelines establish a system of sentencing where an
individual's culpability is taken into account in determining the
guideline range. 58 Specifically, the Guidelines require judges to
harms); Rebecca Dresser, Personal Identity and Punishment, 70 B.U.L. REV. 395, 420
(1990) (arguing retributivists believe the public is permitted to impose punishment equal
to the suffering caused).
54 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch.1, pt. A, app. § 3 (2001) (noting one
goal of Guidelines was to create sentences proportionate to offenses committed); see also
Froyd, supra note 3, at 1476 (stating proportionality of sentences was a key objective of
Commission in creating Guidelines); Selya & Massaro, supra note 1, at 801 (discussing
proportionality as goal of Guidelines).
55 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch.1, pt. A, app. § 3 (2001) (noting
elimination of disparity as goal of Guidelines); see also Froyd, supra note 3, at 1475-76
(discussing elimination of sentencing disparity as primary goal of Guidelines); Limbert,
supra note 1, at 252-53 (discussing goals of Guidelines).
56 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, app. § 3 (noting
Commission adopted traditional goals of proportionality as one objective of Guidelines);
Cotton, supra note 49, at 1315 (discussing retributive goals); Joseph L. Hoffian,
Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the Future?, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255, 267 (2001)
(stating Guidelines contain traditional retributive principles).
57 See Sentencing Report Airs Equity Problems With "Substantial Assistance"
Departures, 66 U.S.L.W. 2503, Feb. 24, 1998 (stating substantial assistance departures
are inconsistent with goals of 1984 Sentencing Reform Act); see also Mascharka, supra
note 19, at 943 (noting reducing sentences in exchange for cooperation results in
inequities); Richman, supra note 30, at *1 (discussing challenges raised by substantial
assistance departures to goals of proportionate sentencing).
58 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 4, pt. A, cmt. (2001) (stating that
Commission believed repeat offenders to be more culpable than first time offenders
therefore criminal history must be accounted for); see also Froyd, supra note 3, at 1481
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look at factors such as the offense level and the defendant's
criminal history.59 Despite these considerations, when a
defendant is granted a substantial assistance departure he or she
receives a sentence below the guideline range based solely on the
assistance provided.60 There are no uniform considerations in
place that require a sentencing judge to consider the defendant's
culpability when determining whether a departure is warranted
or the degree of such a departure.61
The inconsistency between the goal of proportionality and the
effect of substantial assistance departures is intensified by the
existence of the "cooperation paradox."62 Many commentators
suggest that only the most culpable defendants benefit from
cooperating with the government because they are the
individuals with the most valuable information to sell.63 This
(discussing reasons Commission believed it was important to include criminal history as a
factor in determining guideline range); Linda Drazga Maxfield, Prior Dangerous Criminal
Behavior and Sentencing Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 87 IOWA L. REV. 669,
670 (2002) (emphasizing criminal history's importance in determining culpability for
sentencing purposes).
59 See Froyd, supra note 3, at 1480-82 (discussing the use of criminal history and
criminal offense in determining guideline range); see also Gowdy, supra note 1, at 458-59
(noting criminal history and offense level as two most important factors in determining
guideline range). See generally Selya & Massaro, supra note 1, at 801-03 (evaluating
steps taken in determination of guideline range).
60 See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. K, appx. §
5K1.1(a)(1)-(5) (2001) (listing several factors judge should consider in determining
whether departure is warranted, but culpability of defendant is not included); Daniel J.
Freed & Stephen L. Chanenson, Pardon Power and Sentencing Policy, 13 FED. SENT. R.
119, available at 2001 WL 1750545, *6 (2000-01) (indicating departures may lead to
sentences below minimum levels); Selya & Massaro, supra note 1, at 826-30 (discussing
methods and considerations judges use in determining extent of departure for substantial
assistance).
61 See generally Sentencing Report Airs Equity Problems With "Substantial
Assistance" Departures, 66 U.S.L.W. 2503, Feb. 24, 1998 (noting Commission did not set
any rules regarding extent of departure); see also Selya & Massaro, supra note 1, at 825
(acknowledging principles for determining extent of departure are relatively
undeveloped). But see Gowdy, supra note 1, at 475 (stating cooperators should receive
lesser sentences because they should be considered less culpable than non-cooperating
defendants).
62 See Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, And
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 138 (1994) (discussing
problems associated with cooperation paradox); see also Limbert, supra note 1, at 258-59
(illustrating how low-level offenders rarely possess type of information that constitutes
substantial assistance); Froyd, supra note 3, at 1493-94 (discussing how cooperation
paradox benefits high-level offenders who possess information desired by federal
prosecutors, while low-level offenders rarely possess such information).
63 See Froyd, supra note 3, at 1493-94 (noting only high-level offenders have enough
relevant information to receive substantial assistance departures); see also Lee, supra
note 62, at 138 (stating substantial assistance departures result in less culpable
defendants receiving longer sentences than more culpable defendants because the minor
players have less information to offer government); Limbert supra note 1, at 258-59
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phenomenon has been referred to as the "cooperation paradox."
Critics of the "cooperation paradox" claim that only the most
culpable defendants possess the type of information that
amounts to substantial assistance, and therefore, are the only
ones to benefit from the departures. 64 Evaluating the existence of
the "cooperation paradox" poses a unique problem because it is
often difficult to determine the reasons why a departure is not
granted. 65 Additionally, commentators note the lack of appellate
court decisions dealing with the issue of defining what types and
amounts of information qualify as substantial assistance. 66
Despite the lack of case law on this subject, anecdotal evidence
seems to support the existence of a "cooperation paradox."67 For
example, one commentator compared the treatment of a mob
underboss turned informant, who received a five year sentence
for decades of violent criminal activity in return for his
cooperation with the government, and a first time, non-violent
offender, for whom prosecutors refused to recommend a sentence
(discussing how high-level offenders possess information that constitutes substantial
assistance while low-level offenders do not); Richman, supra note 30, at *1 (stating high
level defendants are rewarded by schemes rewarding cooperation).
64 See United States v. Griffin, 17 F.3d 269, 274 (8th Cir. 1994) (Bright, J.,
dissenting):
What kind of criminal justice system rewards the drug kingpin or near-kingpin
who informs on all the criminal colleagues he or she has recruited, but sends to
prison for years and years the least knowledgeable or culpable conspirator, one who
knows very little about the conspiracy and is without information for the
prosecutors?
This demonstrates that small time dealers usually have little to nothing to offer to the
government, while big time dealers are in a position to testify in exchange for a departure.
Limbert, supra note 1, at 258-59. See generally Froyd, supra, note 3, at 1493-94.
65 See Weinstein, supra note 18, at 589-90 (1999) (noting it is difficult to determine
when the government refuses to make a substantial assistance motion because the
information provided by the defendant did not rise to the level of substantial). See
generally Richman, supra note 30, at *1 (concluding most literature about substantial
assistance is based on anecdotal evidence because hard data is difficult to find); Daniel C.
Richman, The Challenges Of Investigation Section 5K1.1 In Practice, 11 FED. SENT. R. 75
available at 1998 WL 1038953, *2-3 (acknowledging difficulties in investigating
application of substantial assistance departures in practice).
66 See generally Richman, supra note 65, at *2-3 (concluding anecdotal evidence
seems to underlie most theories about substantial assistance departures because of the
lack of hard data); Selya & Massaro, supra note 1, at 804-08 (discussing lack of appellate
court decisions on substantive issues regarding substantial assistance departures); The
American College of Trial Lawyers Report and Proposal on Section 5K1. 1 of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1503, 1514 (2001) (decrying lack of
standard in determining whether a defendant has rendered "substantial assistance").
67 See John D.B. Lewis, Cooperation Under the Guidelines, N.Y. L. J., Apr. 30, 1993,
p. 2 (highlighting cases that demonstrate the cooperation paradox); see also Froyd, supra
note 3, at 1493-94 (illustrating how cooperation paradox works). But see Weinstein, supra
note 18, at 611-15 (suggesting cooperation paradox does not exist).
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under five years, to illustrate the disparate treatment of low-level
and high-level offenders. 68 In comparing the disparate treatment
between low-level and high-level offenders, several questions
were posed by the author to illustrate the seemingly unjust
consequences of the government practice of rewarding
cooperation. 69
Several commentators argue that the cooperation paradox does
not exist.70 Many of these commentators base their arguments on
a report made by the Commission, which noted, "only two to
three out of every ten. high level co-conspirators receive
substantial assistance departures."71 According to the
Commission's research, high-level co-conspirators are less likely
to receive substantial assistance departures than low-level co-
conspirators, despite the numerous theories to the contrary.7 2
Perhaps as news of the Commission's findings circulate, the
"cooperation paradox" may fall out of favor, but in the meantime
the "cooperation paradox" remains a criticism of the use of
68 See Lewis, supra note 67, at 2 (comparing cases of Gravano and Sanchez to
illustrate how cooperation paradox works). See generally Garofalo v. Gravano, 23
F.Supp.2d 279, 280-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (discussing sentencing considerations for Gravano,
including his involvement in nineteen murders and people who were arrested or convicted
resulting from his testimony); United States v. Gotti, 771 F.Supp. 552, 554 (E.D.N.Y
1991) (listing acts constituting the racketeering charge, implicating Salvatore Gravano in
ten violent criminal acts).
69 Lewis argued:
Does it make sense that our criminal laws, not to mention the prosecutors'
responsible for enforcing them, let cold-blooded killers walk away even as they
require a promising young man to be locked up for years on a single instance of
poor judgment? Would the policies that lead to such grotesque results be supported
by an informed public? Do the apprehension and conviction of criminals really
require consequences so at odds with the interests of the larger society?
Lewis, supra note 67, at 2. See Virginia G. Villa, Retooling Mandatory Minimum
Sentencing: Fixing the Federal "Statutory Safety Valve" To Act As an Effective
Mechanism for Clemency in Appropriate Cases, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 109, 124 (1997). But
see Bowman, supra note 34, at 48-53 (1999).
70 See Bowman, supra note 34, at 48-53 (citing, amongst many other reasons, lack of
empirical evidence to support these claims); Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *2
(refuting existence of cooperation paradox, despite theories of legal scholars). See
generally Weinstein, supra note 18, at 611-14 (commenting on cooperation paradox).
71 Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *2; see also Weinstein, supra note 18, at 611-14
(discussing Commission's study of cooperation paradox). But see Froyd, supra note 3, at
1494 (stating in drug trade, least culpable co-conspirators, such as couriers and mules,
often receive more stringent sentences than kingpins).
72 See Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *2 (discussing the Commission's research);
see also Weinstein, supra note 18, at 611-14 (suggesting Commission's research proves
cooperation paradox does not exist). But see Thomas N. Whiteside, Symposium: The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Ten Years Later: The Reality of Federal Sentencing:
Beyond the Criticism, 91 NW. U.L. REV. 1574, 1594 (1997) (stating Fifth Circuit has held
courts may limit substantial assistance departures to avoid disparity in sentences when
compared with less culpable co-conspirators).
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substantial assistance departures. 73
Deterrence Goals
The utilitarian theories of punishment focus on specific
deterrence of individual offenders, and general deterrence of
criminal conduct.7 4  The effects of substantial assistance
departures are inconsistent with deterrence objectives in two
ways. First, substantial assistance departures result in
sentences that are too lenient to effectively deter offenders from
future criminal conduct. 75 While there are many difficulties in
studying the recidivism rates for those defendants who receive
substantial assistance departures, anecdotal evidence may be
used to illustrate this point. 76 One illustrative example is the ex-
mob underboss, Salvatore Gravano, who received a five - year
sentence for a laundry list of violent crimes after cooperating
73 See Limbert, supra note 1, at 258-59 (illustrating how small time dealers are
unable to benefit from substantial assistance departures, while larger dealers have
information they can offer to the government in return for lenient sentences); see also
Cynthia K.Y. Lee, From Gatekeeper to Concierge: Reigning in the Federal Prosecutor's
Expanding Power Over Substantial Assistance Departures, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 199, 210
(explaining cooperation paradox is often at play in drug conspiracy cases, as the least
culpable conspirators have little information to share with the government, and thus have
less bargaining power and end up with harsher sentences than their more culpable
counterparts); Mascharka, supra note 19, at 943 (discussing phenomenon known as
cooperation paradox).
74 See Cotton, supra note 49, at 1316 (distinguishing between general and specific
deterrence); see also Michael O'Neill, supra note 51, at 298 (stating utilitarianism is
concerned with punishment in its broader social context and therefore concentrates on the
need for both general and specific deterrence); Parry, supra note 50, at 31-32 (explaining
utilitarian theorists consider both specific and general deterrence as means for
maximizing social welfare).
75 See Richman, supra note 30, at n.14 (discussing cooperation and its lack of
effectiveness as a deterrent); see also Justin H. Dion, Criminal Law - Prosecutorial
Discretion or Contract Theory Restrictions? The Implications of Allowing Judicial Review
of Prosecutorial Discretion Founded on Underlying Contract Principles, 22 W. NEW ENG.
L. REV. 149, 200 (2000) (explaining that as courts are unwilling to review sentencing
departures, prosecutors have the liberty to be lenient without having to defend their
decisions to the public). See generally The American College of Trial Lawyers Proposed
Modifications to the Relevant Conduct Provisions of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, supra note 66, at 1532 (noting recidivism is a factor considered in making
sentencing departure decisions).
76 See Richman, supra note 30, at n.14 (stating anecdotal evidence supports the
contention that rewarding cooperation is an ineffective deterrent). See generally MODERN
DICT. FOR THE LEGAL PROF. (2001) (defining recidivism as "tendency of an individual to
return to a former mode of behavior such as a criminal who, after being released from
prison, commits another crime"). But see Elizabeth Williams, Annotation, Construction
and Application of United States Sentencing Guideline § 2G2.1 et seq., Pertaining to
Child Pornography, 145 A.L.R. FED. 481, 18 (2002) (noting courts have departed from
sentencing guidelines when evidence presented an increased likelihood of recidivism).
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with the government. 77 Recently, Gravano plead guilty to drug
charges, illustrating the prior sentence was not an effective
deterrent.78 Secondly, many commentators argue substantial
assistance departures send the wrong message to society. For
instance, one commentator stated that government- rewarded
cooperation sends the public the message "the more you know the
better the deal."79 While it is difficult to test whether rewarding
cooperation with lenient sentences and government witness
protection is an effective deterrent to the public,80 it seems that
such a practice would not deter individuals from criminal
activity.
Elimination ofDisparity
Prior to the promulgation of the Guidelines there were great
disparities between sentences for similar crimes.8 1 One of the
goals of the Guidelines was to eliminate this disparity.8 2 It is
77 See Joseph P. Fried, Ex-Mob Underboss Given Lenient Term For Help As Witness,
N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1994, Sec. A, p. 1, col. 1 (noting Gravano was sentenced to a five-
year prison term for committing nineteen murders in exchange for his cooperation with
government); see also Pete Bowles, Gravano Guilty In Ecstasy Case, NEWSDAY, Jun. 30,
2001, p. A04 (discussing lenient sentence Gravano received in exchange for cooperation);
The Return Of Sammy The Bull, N. Y. TIMES, Jun. 26, 2001, Sec. A, p. 18, col. 1
(discussing Gravano's five year prison sentence).
78 See Christopher Francescani, Strong As A "Bull:" How Sammy Flexed His Muscles,
N.Y. POST, Aug. 17, 2001 (discussing Gravano's plea to drug charges); see also Bowles,
supra note 77, at p. A04 (acknowledging Gravano plead guilty to drug charges and now
faces 23 years in prison); Mike Claffey, Two Wiseguys Cracking Wise, DAILY NEWS, Jul. 1,
2001, p. 15 (discussing charges against Gravano).
79 Chambers, supra note 45, at p. 13, col. 1; see Hrvatin, supra note 7, at 119 (stating
high-level offenders with the most knowledge about drug operations can take the most
advantage of substantial assistance departures); Lee, supra note 73, at 209 (questioning
wisdom of giving lighter sentences to defendants who "snitch" on other persons).
8o See generally Chambers, supra note 45, at p.1 3 , col. 1 (noting that rewarding
cooperation and placing criminals under witness protection may not be in the best
interests of society); Judge Rudolph J. Gerber, Essay, On Dispensing Injustice, 43 ARIZ. L.
REV. 135, 136 (2001) (opining Arizona's judicial leniency resulting from mandatory
sentencing leads to fallacies regarding deterrence).
81 See Froyd, supra note 3, at 1473-75 (discussing methods used to determine
sentences prior to the Guidelines); Todd E. Witten, Comment, Sentence Entrapment and
Manipulation: Government Manipulation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29
AKRON L. REV. 697, 697 (1996) (stating prior to Guidelines, public wanted to end disparity
in sentencing); The American College of Trial Lawyers Proposed Modifications to the
Relevant Conduct Provisions of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 38 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1463, 1463 (2001) (stating that "[tlhe perception developed that the 'unfettered
discretion' of judges and parole authorities in imposing and implementing sentences
resulted in unwarranted disparity among offenders with similar criminal backgrounds
convicted of similar crimes committed under similar circumstances, as well as
concomitant problems of unfairness, uncertainty, and dishonesty in sentencing.").
82 See Froyd, supra note 3, at 1476 (noting one of the goals of the Guidelines was to
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suggested that the use of substantial assistance departures
increases sentencing disparity.83 When a substantial assistance
departure is granted, the judge is permitted to sentence that
defendant to a lesser sentence than that prescribed by the
Guidelines, therefore the cooperating defendant receives a lighter
sentence than a similarly situated defendant who has committed
the same crime and does not cooperate.8 4 This problem is
intensified by the lack of formal considerations in place for
determining the degree of the departure.8 5 The degree of the
departure is left in the hands of a sentencing judge, possibly
guided by the recommendation of a prosecutor.8 6 This situation
creates vast disparities in the sentences received by cooperating
defendants. 87
eliminate sentencing disparity); Joan Tagliareni, Actual Contamination in the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: To Prove or Not to Prove, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 413, 413
(1995) (explaining that Guidelines were enacted to remedy problems with earlier
sentencing methods and create cohesion in sentencing law); The American College of Trial
Lawyers Proposed Modifications to the Relevant Conduct Provisions of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 81, at 1463 (stating that as a result of disparity in
sentencing, Congress established United States Sentencing Commission with the
direction to establish sentencing guidelines).
83 See Gowdy, supra note 1, at 476 (stating costs of exchanging leniency for testimony
include great sentencing disparities among similarly situated defendants); see also
Chambers, supra note 18, at 13, col. 1 (discussing San Diego federal judge who resigned
because of the increase in sentencing disparity caused by the Guidelines); Floyd D.
Weatherspoon, The Devastating Impact of the Justice System on the Status of African-
American Males: An Overview Perspective, 23 CAP. U.L. REV. 23, 39-40 (stating a U.S.
General Accounting Office report revealed disparities in sentencing between blacks and
whites for the same offense since the Guidelines were enacted).
84 See Hrvatin, supra note 7, at 152-53 (stating cooperating defendants often engage
in more serious criminal behavior, but end up with lighter sentences than less culpable
defenders due to their ability to cooperate with prosecutors); Lee, supra note 73, at 209
(stating the cooperating defendant who is more culpable than his counterpart receives a
lighter sentence in reward for his willingness to turn state's evidence); Richman, supra
note 65, at *1 (noting substantial assistance departures threaten the goal of horizontal
equity in sentencing).
85 See Gowdy, supra note 1, at 468 (noting Guidelines say nothing about how much a
judge may reduce a sentence when making a downward departure); see also Richman,
supra note 65, at * 1 (stating equity problems are worsened by the lack of guidance in how
cooperators should be treated); Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at, at *3-7 (discussing
the lack of guidelines governing extent of departure when a judge decides to depart).
86 See Stiller, supra note 2, at 108 (noting that federal judges defer to federal
prosecutors' recommendations on the magnitude of the departure). See generally 874 F.
2d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that a three step process is utilized by the federal courts
used when determining a departure); Robert H. Smith, Departure Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Should a Mitigating or Aggravating Circumstance Be Deemed
"Adequately Considered" Through 'Negative Implication?" 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 286
(1994) (postulating that the degree of departure be measured by a standard of
reasonableness).
87 See Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *1-7 (noting lack of guidelines for
determining extent of departure leads to inconsistency); Linda Drazga Maxfield & John
H. Kramer, Substantial Assistance: An Empirical Yardstick Gauging Equity in Current
602 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
In addition to the problems created by the lack of formal
guidance for determining the degree of the departure, 5K1.1
practices differ through out the districts. There are no uniform
definitions as to what constitutes substantial assistance across
the districts.88 Federal prosecutors are left unguided in
determining whether the assistance provided by a defendant
amounts to substantial assistance.89 While federal prosecutors
may have to conform to written guidelines that apply to their
district, there are no similar guidelines that apply across the
districts. 90 The inconsistency in the definition of substantial
assistance ultimately results in sentencing disparity.91 The
Commission, realizing the potential disparity problems,
conducted research as to how Section 5K1.1 worked in practice.92
The initial report from the Commission revealed that Section
5K1.1 practices greatly varied across the districts. 93 The report
Federal Policy and Practice, 11 FED. SENT. R. 6 available at 1998 WL 911926, at *6 (Vera
Inst. Just.) (stating the current structure results in dissimilar sentences for similar
offenders).
88 See Sentencing Report Airs Equity Problems With 'Substantial Assistance'
Departures, U.S. L. WEEK, Feb. 24, 1998 at 2503 (discussing difference in federal
standards dictating what constitutes substantial assistance); see also Chambers, supra
note 18, at 13, col. 1 (quoting Thomas W. Hiller II, "In all judicial districts, the U.S.
attorneys look at cooperation subjectively and may reward it, or may not..."); Lee, supra
note 62, at 125-27 (noting different prosecutors' offices have different substantial
assistance policies); Limbert, supra note 1, at 259 (discussing how policies regulating
cooperation practices vary widely from district to district).
89 See Stiller, supra note 2, at 109 (arguing application of Section 5K1.1 is left in the
hands of federal prosecutors); see also Abramowitz, supra note 15, at p. 3, col. 1 (stating
that in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York the decision to file a 5K1.1
motion is left entirely in the discretion of the prosecutor); Lee, supra note 62, at 127-28
(noting in districts with no formal substantial assistance policy each Assistant United
States Attorney has discretion to decide whether or when to file substantial assistance
motion).
90 See Gowdy, supra note 1, at 466 (noting many U.S. Attorney's Offices ignore local
5K1 procedures and many more offices have no written procedure); Maxfield & Kramer,
supra note 87, at *6 (stating as of 1995 20.2% of U.S. Attorney's Offices maintained
written policies providing guidance for substantial assistance departures); see also Lee,
supra note 62, at 125-27 (illustrating differences in substantial assistance policies by
comparing policies in Central District of Illinois and District of Columbia).
91 See Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 87, at 1-5 (explaining that the sentencing
commission discovered unevenness and unwarranted use among U.S. Attorney offices).
See generally, 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (stating the purpose of the Sentencing Commission is to
establish policies and practices that provide certainty and fairness).
92 See Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 87, at 1-5 (discussing the efforts of the
Sentencing Commission to research and evaluate problems of the disparities in
sentencing stemming from 5K1.1 practices); see also Richman, supra note 65, at *1
(discussing difficulties in evaluating effectiveness of 5K1.1).
93 See Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 87, at 1-5 (discussing the researching efforts of
the Sentencing Commission of the sentencing disparities from 5K1.1 practices); see also
Lee, supra note 62, at 125-27 (comparing differences in 5K1.1 practice between Central
District of Illinois and District of Columbia); Richman, supra note 65, at *1 (discussing
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found variations in Section 5K1.1 practices are partially
attributable to the fact that substantial assistance is considered
differently throughout the districts. 94 The differences in these
practices create sentencing disparity across the districts, which is
essentially what the Guidelines were created to eliminate.
BENEFITS OF THE SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE DEPARTURE
As discussed above substantial assistance departures are
criticized because they result in sentences that are
disproportionate to the crimes committed, 95 create sentencing
disparity,96 and are not effective deterrents.97 Despite the
problems with the use of substantial assistance departures the
federal government has chosen to codify this age old practice 98 of
rewarding cooperation in Section 5K1.1.99 Some commentators
the difference between the 5K1. 1 practices in the Eastern District of Virginia and the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania).
94 See Richman, supra, note 65, at *1 (noting that differences as to what constitutes
substantial assistance attributes to the equity problem); see also Maxfield & Kramer,
supra note 87, at 1-5 (discussing the efforts of the Sentencing Commission to research and
evaluate problems of the disparities in sentencing stemming from 5K1.1 practices); Lee,
supra note 62, at 123-29 (comparing 5K1.1 practices of different prosecutors and in
different districts to illustrate how lack of guidelines defiming substantial assistance
creates disparity).
95 See Richman, supra note 30, at *1-2 (noting discounts in sentences given to
cooperators challenge goals of proportionality). See generally Theresa Karle and Thomas
Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: Empirical
and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY, L.J. 393, (stating that the Guidelines were devised to
reduce disproportionate sentencing).
96 See Lee, supra note 62, at 123-129 (illustrating how current 5K1.1 practices
threaten equity goals of Guidelines); Richman, supra, note 65, at *1 (noting equity
problems in sentencing caused by substantial assistance departures). See generally 28
U.S.C. § 991(b) (stating the purpose of the Sentencing Commission is to establish policies
and practices that avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities).
97 See Chambers, supra note 18, at p.13, col. 1 (stating government-rewarded
cooperation sends the wrong messages to criminal); Richman, supra, note 30, at *2
(discussing negative effects on deterrence caused by government-rewarded cooperation);
Smith, supra, note 86, at 286 n.225 (noting loose guidelines would seriously compromise
the deterrent effect of the system).
98 See Richman, supra note 30, at *1 (noting practices rewarding cooperation are long
standing tradition); see also Gowdy, supra note 1, at 455 (discussing The Whiskey Cases
and how leniency in exchange for testimony is a long standing tradition in American
jurisprudence). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) (providing the purposes of sentencing).
99 See Selya & Massaro, supra note 1, at 803-04 (discussing Congressional direction
that cooperation be rewarded in the Guidelines). See generally Rosemary Cakmis and
James Skuthan, Survey Article: Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 50 MERCER L. REV. 1035,
1059 (1999) (stating that Section 5K1.1 addresses cooperation before sentencing and
works in tandem with Rule 35(b) to give the Government two opportunities to reward a
defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of other); Ross
Galin, Note, Above the Law: The Prosecutor's Duty to Seek Justice and the Performance
of Substantial Assistance Agreements, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2000) (stating
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defend the practice of granting substantial assistance departures
to cooperators.100 In this section, the benefits of substantial
assistance departures will be discussed and evaluated in an
effort to determine if the benefits of substantial assistance
departures really outweigh the costs the use of such departures
inflict on the goals of sentencing.
Benefits to Law Enforcement
The main justification for the use of substantial assistance
departures is the benefit received by law enforcement.101 It is
argued that without the information and testimony received by
cooperators, many upper-level criminals would not be arrested
and prosecuted.l02 Commentators argue that cooperators would
not come forward without some benefit to themselves, and it is
therefore necessary to reward their cooperation with a lighter
sentence.1 03 Additionally, some cooperators place themselves in
great danger by providing law enforcement with information
about other defendants.104 It is asserted that the risks the
that 5K1.1 motions are an important tool used by prosecutors to induce and reward both
guilty pleas and cooperation).
100 See Sentence Reductions Based on Defendants' Substantial Assistance to the
Government, 11 FED. SENT. R. 18 available at 1998 WL 911927 (stating there is a general
consensus that the benefits of substantial assistance departures include increasing the
plea rate, saving judicial time and resources and creating new criminal cases); see also
Arkin, supra note 46, at p. 3, col. 1 (recognizing no criminal justice system would function
effectively without the use of cooperating witnesses); Galin, supra note 99, at 1245
(recognizing importance of 5K1. 1 to reward cooperation and induce guilty pleas).
101 See Gowdy, supra note 1, at 474 (noting primary benefit of substantial assistance
departures is the assistance to law enforcement in the prosecution and conviction of
defendants); see also Prepared Testimony of John Roth Chiel Narcotic and Dangerous
Drug Section Criminal Division, Federal News Serv., May 11, 2000 (Statements of John
Roth before the House Government Reform Committee Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice) [hereinafter Testimonj (stating that substantial assistance departures are
essential to combat drug trafficking crimes); James Dowden, Note, United States v.
Singleton: A Warning Shot Heard Round the Circuits 40 B. C. L. REV. 897, 901 (1999)
(stating that the Sentencing Commission has noted that a defendant's assistance in the
resolution of other criminal investigations helps resolve criminal cases).
102 See Richman, supra note 30, at *3-4 (stating many upper-level criminals would
not be convicted without the testimony of lower-level cooperating defendants); see also
Chambers, supra note 45, at p. 13, col. 1 (discussing criticisms of government practice of
rewarding low-level criminals to catch upper-level criminals). See generally Testimony,
supra note 101 (stating that federal prosecutor's jobs in combating drug trafficking would
be nearly impossible without substantial assistance departures).
103 See Richman, supra note 30, at *4 (noting it is necessary to pay criminals for
information); see also Arkin, supra note 46, at p.3, col. 1 (noting informants need some
encouragement to come forward and cooperate with the government); Chambers, supra
note 45, at p.1 3 , col. 1 (quoting federal prosecutor's statement that recognition must be
paid to cooperating defendants in order for them to work with the government).
104 See generally U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5K1.1(a)(4) (2001)(noting
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cooperator takes deserve some recognition.105 While the arrest,
prosecution and conviction of upper-level criminals is a
legitimate justification for the use of substantial assistance
departures, some commentators have criticized this
justification.106 One criticism is that the cooperator's testimony is
suspect due to credibility problems, and is not as valuable as it
may appear at first glance.10 7 Another criticism focuses on the
effect of giving the cooperator a lighter sentence.108 Some
commentators argue the cooperator may continue a life of crime
after he serves his reduced sentence.109 Another argument is
allowing low-level criminals to go free in order to convict upper-
injury, danger, or risk of injury to cooperating defendant or his family should be
considered in determining whether the departure should be granted); Rob Drummond,
Recent Development: Florida v. J.L: Phone Calls, Guns, and Searches, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L.
415, 419 (2000) (illustrating danger taken any time an individual cooperates with law
enforcement regarding illegal activity); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO
ST. L. J. 69, 69 (1995) (stating that danger to cooperators and their families can be
significant).
105 See generallyU.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 5Kl.1(a)(4) (2001) (stating
risks cooperator takes should be considered in determining whether departure should be
granted). See generally, Hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice Oversight, Federal News Serv., Oct. 13, 2000 (statements of John Steer,
Vice Chair, U.S. Sentencing Commission) (opining that substantial assistance is an
important law enforcement tool); G. Adam Schweickert, III, Note, Third Party
Cooperation: A Welcome Addition to Substantial Assistance Departure Jurisprudence, 30
CONN. L. REV. 1445, 1457 (1998) (listing criteria used to determine sentence reduction for
substantial assistance, including potential danger to cooperator);.
106 See Gowdy, supra, note 1 at, 475-477 (discussing various costs of government-
rewarded cooperation); see also Chambers, supra, note 44 at, p. 13, col. 1 (criticizing use of
substantial assistance departures to reward cooperation). See generally Tracey Tyler,
Man Jailed in Klling Seeks Bail, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 9, 2002 at B07 (illustrating
unreliability ofjailhouse informants).
107 See Gowdy, supra, note 1, at 476 (discussing risks that cooperators will fabricate
testimony); see also Richman, supra, note 30, at *2-3 (discussing problems of cooperators
perjuring themselves). See generally Lisa M. Farabee, Disparate Departures Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Tale of Two Districts, 30 CONN. L. REV. 569, 620 (1998)
(stating that credibility of statements is generally requirement for granting substantial
assistance).
108 See Richman, supra, note 30, at n. 14 (discussing how rewarding cooperation is an
ineffective deterrent); see also Chambers, supra note 44, at p. 13, col. 1 (criticizing system
of rewarding cooperation as being detrimental to society). But see Bowman, supra note
34, at 50 (1999) (arguing that use of substantial assistance departures is a sound policy).
109 See Richman, supra, note 30, at n.14 (stating anecdotal evidence supports
contentions that criminals escaping harsh sentences by cooperating are likely to engage in
criminal behavior again); Mafia Informer Jailed for Running Ecstasy Ring in U.S,
SUNDAY TRIBUNE, September 9, 2002, at p.21 (showing example of informer that received
reduced sentence for cooperation and recidivated). See generally Thomas R. Goots,
Comment, "A Thug in Prison Cannot Shoot Your Sister". Ohio Appears Ready to
Resurrect the Habitual Criminal Statute-Will it Withstand an Eighth Amendment
Challenge, 28 AKRON L. REV. 253, 275 n.141 (1995) (referring to 1983 Bureau of Justice
statistics which found that 62.5% of prisoners released were rearrested within three
years).
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level criminals is not in the best interests of society. I10 Finally, it
has been asserted that after a high-level criminal has been
arrested and convicted, law enforcement officials may later have
a need for information he possesses and may be successful in
obtaining a release or shorter sentence for him as well. I I I
Despite these criticisms, it is maintained that cooperator
testimony is necessary to law enforcement objectives, and
therefore, is a necessary evil.' 12 There is support for the necessity
of cooperator testimony to law enforcement objectives.11 3 The
Commission conducted a study of 130 narcotics defendants who
provided substantial assistance.11 4 The study revealed that the
assistance these defendants provided resulted in twenty-one trial
110 See Chambers, supra note 44, at p. 13, col. 1 (discussing how use of witness
protection and allowing criminals back into society is detrimental to society). See
generally The American College of Trial Lawyers Report and Proposal on Section 5K1.1 of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 66, at 1525 (stating that more
culpable defendants often receive lighter sentences than less culpable defendants because
of substantial assistance); Farabee, supra note 107, at 583 (arguing that more culpable
defendants benefit most from substantial assistance departures).
111 See Chambers, supra note 44, at p. 13, col. 1 (discussing federal prosecutor's
request to allow a felon convicted for life without parole to go free after the felon provided
the government with information that led to the conviction of a group of major narcotic
dealers). See generallyHenry Pierson Curtis, Judges OK Drug Conviction; The Ruling On
Appeal Cleared a Federal Prosecutor in the Handling of the Trial, ORLANDO SENTINEL
TRIBUNE, Nov. 22, 2002, at p. B3 (stating that convicted felons received reduced sentences
in exchange for their testimony); Mitchel Maddux, Informant Gets 18 Months For
Stealing $1M, Despite His Help In Probe, Judge Criticizes Man, THE RECORD (BERGEN
COUNTY, NJ), Jan. 15, 2002, at p. A3 (explaining how career informant was finally
arrested for fraud and was given leniency because of substantial assistance).
112 See Gowdy, supra, note 1, at 474-75 (evaluating evidence supporting the need for
cooperator testimony in law enforcement); George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law
and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000) (suggesting that
compensating witnesses in form of leniency is necessary evil without which prosecution of
most culpable defendants may be impossible). See generally Jack B. Weinstein, A TriAl
Judge's Reflections on Departures From the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 5 FED. SENT.
R. 6, available at 1992 WL 230671 at 1-2 (1992) (stating reasons of practicality that make
downward departures a useful tool).
113 See Gowdy, supra note 1, at 474 (discussing anecdotal support for contentions that
cooperation is necessary to achieve law enforcement objectives); see also Steven M. Cohen,
Effective Screening for Truth Telling- Is It Possible? What Is True? Perspectives of a
Former Prosecutor, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 817, 827 (2002) (mentioning necessity of relying
on informants and accomplices to obtain convictions); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation
with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM
L. REV. 917, 921 (1999) (stating most federal criminal cases are resolved partly on
testimony of cooperating defendants).
114 See Gowdy, supra note 1, at 474 (discussing United States Sentencing Commission
study). See generally Harris, supra note 112, at 18 (mentioning statistics kept by U.S.
Sentencing Commission reveal one of every five defendants won mitigation through
providing substantial assistance); Weinstein, supra note 18, at 564 (stating one of every
five defendants sentenced in federal court in 1996 won mitigation by providing
substantial assistance).
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convictions and fifty-nine guilty pleas.' 5 Additionally, cooperator
testimony has helped to solve 250 gang-related murders, and
helped to convict 300 persons in the Southern District of New
York.116 Although this evidence is mostly anecdotal, it lends
strong support to the contention that the use of cooperators is
necessary to the success of law enforcement's objectives. 117 Given
the necessity of cooperator testimony to law enforcement
objectives, it appears that the substantial assistance departure is
beneficial, despite all its faults." 18
Benefits to the Criminal Defendant
Despite the criticisms of substantial assistance departures,
they are, in some ways, beneficial to the criminal defendant.
Specifically, substantial assistance departures provide criminal
defendants with an escape from harsh mandatory minimum
sentences.119 As noted previously, although a motion under
115 See Gowdy, supra note 1, at 474 (discussing United States Sentencing Commission
study). See generally Jonathan D. Lupkin, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1519, 1519 (1991) 5K1.1
and Substantial Assistance Departure: The Illusory Carrot of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, (mentioning cooperator testimony results in conviction and incarceration of
other criminals); Selya & Massaro, supra note 1, at 807 (mentioning substantial
assistance departures occur with great frequency in instances involving convictions for
drug trafficking).
116 See Gowdy, supra note 1, at 475 (quoting Steven M. Cohen, "Singleton" Turns the
Tables Too Far, 21 Nat'l L.J. Nov. 16, 1998, at A27). See generally Ellen S. Podgor,
Perspectives on the Role of Cooperators and Informants: White-Colar Cooperators. The
Government Employer- Employee Relationships, 23 CARDOzO L. REV. 795, 800 (2002)
(discussing how cooperators information and testimony are key ingredients to operating
criminal systems efficiently); Michael A. Simons, New Voices on the War on Drugs:
Departing Ways: Uniformity, Disparity and Cooperation in Federal Drug Sentences, 47
VILL. L. REV. 921, 955-56 (2002) (implying cooperation increases chances of getting
convictions).
117 See Gowdy, supra, note 1, at 475 (stating despite reliance on anecdotal evidence it
is generally accepted that government-rewarded cooperation benefits prosecutors and law
enforcement in their crime fighting efforts); see also Cohen, supra note 113, at 827
(mentioning necessity of relying on informants and accomplices to obtain convictions);
Podgor, supra note 116, at 800 (acknowledging cooperator testimony is a key ingredient
to operating an efficient criminal system).
118 See generally Arkin, supra note 46, at p.3, col. 1 (discussing substantial assistance
departures as incentive for cooperation); Limbert, supra note 1, at 251 (stating use of
informants is one of law enforcements most essential investigative tools); Podgor, supra
note 116, at 801 (discussing flaws of cooperation agreements balanced against need for
information related to crimes).
119 See Simons, supra note 116, at 924 (stating "cooperation is one of the most viable
ways for prosecutors to ameliorate the rigidity and severity of the mandated drug
sentences."); see also Lee, supra note 73, at 204 (1997) (discussing section 5K1.1 of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual and 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (e) and mentioning how
these provisions authorize the court to depart downward from applicable guideline range
or mandatory minimum sentence); Limbert, supra note 1, at 251 (discussing how
substantial assistance departures can be an escape from harsh guideline sentences).
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Section 5K1.1 does not permit a judge to depart from mandatory
minimum sentences, a second motion under 18 U.S.C. 3553(e)
may be made to depart below the mandatory minimum based on
a defendant's substantial assistance. This creates a large
incentive for the defendant to cooperate with the government
because the mandatory minimum sentences instituted by the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 are severe. 12 0  Many
commentators criticize these mandatory minimum sentences as
being unduly harsh, especially with respect to low-level drug
offenders.12  The prospect of receiving a sentence below the
mandatory minimum is an obvious benefit. Many members of
the defense bar support substantial assistance departures on the
basis that they are the only way to protect their clients from the
unduly harsh mandatory minimum sentences. 2 2 It has also been
suggested that substantial assistance departures may be
motivated, in some cases, by judges' frustrations with a
sentencing system that they believe is unduly harsh, rather than
law enforcement's need for information. 123
120 See Froyd, supra note 3, at 1471 (discussing harsh sentences imposed after
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984); see also Fried, supra note 77, at p. 1, col. 1 (quoting
Manhattan attorney describing sentences provided for by Guidelines as "draconian");
Mascharka, supra note 19, at 935 (noting current popularity of mandatory minimum
sentences).
121 See Floyd, supra note 3, at 1471 (focusing on mandatory minimum sentences for
drug offenses); see also Lewis, supra note 67, at 2 (noting in vast majority of drug cases
filed in Eastern and Southern District of New York cooperation is only way to avoid harsh
mandatory minimum prison sentences); Simons, supra note 116, at 922-23 (stating
"despite frequent criticism of these drug sentences, drug war policy- makers remain
devoted to incarceration").
122 See Arkin, supra note 46, at p. 3, col. 1 (acknowledging every defense attorney
speaks with their client about benefits of cooperation); see also Lee, supra note 73, at 207
(mentioning cooperation is the primary way defendants can receive leniency in
sentencing). But see Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *3 (noting while substantial
assistance departures benefit criminal defendants who provide substantial assistance,
many in defense community argue Section 5K1.1 fosters distrust among defendants and
creates incentives to lie).
123 See Richman, supra note 30, at *4 (suggesting sentencing discounts for
cooperation may be motivated not by law enforcements' need for information, but that
sentences given to cooperators reflect judges frustrations with a sentencing regime they
believe is too harsh); see also Plato Cacheris, Responsibilities of the Criminal Defense
Attorney, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 33, 34 (1996) (discussing judges are practically powerless
because mandatory sentencing guidelines have removed their discretion on sentencing).
See generally Celesta A. Albonetti, Legal Issues and Socio-legal Consequences of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Effects of the "Safety Valve" Amendment on Length
of Imprisonment for Cocaine Trafficking/Manufacturing Offenders: Mitigating the Effects
of Mandatory Minimum Penalties and Offender's Ethnicity, 87 IOWA L. REV. 401, 402
(2002) (discussing when safety valves are used to avoid mandatory minimum sentences).
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SHOULD SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE DEPARTURES BE ABOLISHED?
Some commentators advocate the abolishment of substantial
assistance departures because of the injustices and inequities
these departures create. 124 However it is asserted that despite
the problems associated with substantial assistance departures,
they are here to stay.
Congress expressly mandated that the Commission in some
form should reward cooperation.125 Obviously, Congress believed
it was desirable to reward cooperators at the sentencing stage.
In addition to the Congressional mandate that cooperation
should be rewarded, substantial assistance departures do provide
benefits to both law enforcement agencies, 126 and criminal
defendants. 127
Recently, the legality of substantial assistance departures was
called into question by a Tenth Circuit case. In United States v.
Singleton,128 the defendant, Singleton was convicted based on
testimony of a co-defendant.129 The co-defendant's testimony was
124 See Lewis, supra note 67, at 2 (arguing substantial assistance departures should
be abolished because of costs they impose on society); see also Lee & Derdowski, supra
note 30, at * 2-3 (discussing arguments that substantial assistance departures should be
abolished); The American College of Trial Lawyers Report and Proposal on Section 5K1.1
of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 66, at 1513 (discussing criticism of
5Kl. 1 mentioning it "generates widespread inequities in sentencing and fails to promote
the law enforcement goals").
125 See Selya & Massaro, supra note 1, at 803-04 (noting Congress expressly provided
Commission take cooperation into account in sentencing); see also Bowman, supra note
34, at 13-15 (1999) (discussing substantial assistance as a change made by the Sentencing
Reform Act and the Guidelines which allows defendants to receive sentences below
statutory minimum); Kimberly S. Kelley, Substantial Assistance Under the Guidelines:
How Smitherman Transfers Sentencing Discretion from Judges to Prosecutors, 79 IOWA
L. REV. 187, 202-03 (1990) (mentioning Congress "directs the Sentencing Commission to
allow for a lower sentence when a defendant has provided substantial assistance").
126 See Hearings, supra note 3 (testimony of Mr. Steer) (arguing substantial
assistance is a critical law enforcement tool); see also Gowdy, supra note 1, at 474-75
(discussing numerous examples of how cooperator testimony aids law enforcement);
Limbert, supra note 1, at 251 (stating use of informants is one of law enforcement's oldest
and most essential investigative tools).
127 See Lee, supra note 62, at 177 (discussing substantial assistance departures as
way for defendant to avoid mandatory minimum sentences); see also Limbert, supra note
1, at 251 (discussing how substantial assistance departures can be an escape from harsh
guideline sentences); Podgor, supra note 116, at 798 (stating "culpable individuals that
can implicate others can receive the benefit of decreased punishment").
128 United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rehearing en banc
granted, opinion vacated by 144 F.3d 1361 (Jul. 10, 1998).
129 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1298 (stating Singleton was convicted of money
laundering and conspiracy to distribute cocaine); see also Lee & Derdowski, supra note
30, at *3 (noting co-defendant testified at Singleton's trial). See generally A. Jack Finklea,
Leniency in Exchange for Testimony: Bribery or Effective Prosecution, 33 IND. L. REV.
957, 958 (2000) (explaining that Ms. Singleton's conviction was adduced primarily from
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given in exchange for a promise by federal prosecutors to make a
substantial assistance motion on behalf of the co-defendant.130
Singleton appealed her conviction on the ground that the
cooperation agreement between the cooperating defendant and
the government violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2).131 18 U.S.C. §
201(c)(2) criminalizes offering or promising to give something of
value to a person in exchange for testimony given in a court
proceeding.132  The Tenth Circuit held that the federal
government was not exempt from 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2).133 The
court found that the government's promise to file a substantial
assistance departure was something of value to the cooperating
defendant and therefore violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2).134 On
rehearing en banc, however, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed the decision, holding that the term "whoever"
does not include the United States when it is acting in its
sovereign capacity.135 The Court found that Assistant United
testimony of co-defendant).
130 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1298 (stating co-defendant's testimony was given in
exchange for leniency); see also Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *3 (noting co-
defendant was promised a substantial assistance motion in exchange for his testimony).
See generally Jeffrey M. Schumm, Courts Rush to Extinguish Singleton, But Are the
Embers of the Panel's Decision Still Glowing, 27 FLA. ST. L. REV 325, 330 (1999)
(indicating testimony by co-defendant came after prosecutor's promise of leniency).
131 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1299 (discussing grounds for Singleton's appeal); see
also Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *3 (noting Singleton argued that the cooperation
agreement violated the federal bribery statute). See generally Schumm, supra note 130,
at 330 (averring that issue on appeal was 18 U.S.C. § 201(C)(2) as applied to the
government).
132 18 U.S.C. § 201(C)(2) provides whoever:
directly or indirectly, gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any person, for
or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given by such
person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court, any
committee of either House or both Houses of Congress, or any agency, commission,
or officer authorized by the laws of the United States to hear evidence or take
testimony, or for or because of such person's absence therefrom; shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
See generally Dowden, supra note 101, at 913; Schumm, supra note 130, at 329.
133 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1298 (noting holding of Singleton I% see also Lee &
Derdowski, supra note 30, at *3 (discussing holding of Singleton 1). See generally
Schumm, supra note 130, at 330 (explaining that federal prosecutors fall within the
intended scope of 18 U.S.C. § 201(C)(2)).
134 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1298 (noting holding of Singleton ); see also Lee &
Derdowski, supra note 30, at *3 (discussing reasoning behind court's holding in Singleton
1). See generally Dowden, supra note 101, at 916 (discussing meaning and scope of
"something of value" as applied to 18 U.S.C. § 201(C)(2)).
135 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1299-1301(discussing multiple rationales for excluding
application of Section 201(C)(2) to government when acting in sovereign capacity); see
also Moreau, supra note 12, at 171-72 (noting courts holding that term "whoever" does not
apply to federal government acting in its sovereign capacity); Schumm, supra note 130, at
332-33 (indicating comprehensive review of use of term "whoever").
[Vol. 17:585
SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE DEPARTURES
States Attorneys, acting as "alter egos" of the United States
government, are not prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) from
offering cooperating defendants a possible sentence reduction in
exchange for their cooperation.136 Since the decision of the Tenth
Circuit, a majority of the circuit courts have adopted this
interpretation of the federal bribery statute and rejected that the
use of substantial assistance departures violates 18 U.S.C. § 201
(c)(2).137
While there are many problems associated with substantial
assistance departures, many of these concerns can be cured
through reform to Section 5K1.1.138 The following section
suggests three possible steps that may be taken in an effort to
reduce the threat substantial assistance departures pose to goals
of uniform sentencing, proportionate sentencing, and deterrence
of criminal activity.
PROPOSED REFORMS TO SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE DEPARTURES
Substantial assistance departures are likely to remain a part of
the federal sentencing scheme.139 It cannot, however, be ignored
that the use of substantial assistance departures is inconsistent
136 See Singleton, 165 F.3d at 1299-1301 (describing federal prosecutors as alter egos
of the United States government); see also Dowden, supra note 101, at 919-20 (explaining
that agreements between defendant and U.S. Attorney were merely avenues for
agreements with the United States). See generally Schumm, supra note 130, at 331
(indicating that when U.S. Attorneys act within defined parameters of their job, 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(C)(2) does not apply).
137 See United States v. Hunte, 193 F.3d 173, 174 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding federal
bribery statute does not apply to federal prosecutors and collecting cases adopting
Singleton 11); United States v. James, 195 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting circuit
courts have unanimously held federal bribery statute is inapplicable to federal
government). But see Finklea, supra note 129, at 988-89 (asserting that guidelines set out
should apply with equal weight to both sides in an action).
138 See generally, Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *2 (recommending measures of
reform to Section 5Kl.1); Limbert, supra note 1, at 251-52 (discussing possible means of
reducing problems associated with substantial assistance departures); Stiller, supra note
2, at 109-10 (suggesting development of application principles will help to clarify Section
5K1.1); Weinstein, supra note 18, at 629-31 (advocating reducing number of substantial
assistance departures in order to eliminate problems associated with Section 5K1. 1).
139 See generally Gowdy, supra note 1, at 477; Hrvatin, supra note, at 7. But see
Lewis, supra note 67, at 2:
When the law reduces the dispensing of justice to a crass exchange of information
for sentencing clemency, it ill serves the society it was intended to protect. It also
debases the legal system and demeans everyone involved in that system. As a
policy choice, the guidelines' monolithic insistence on cooperation has proved a
moral failure; as a purportedly pragmatic tool for law enforcement, it has produced
enormous suffering with no countervailing benefits. It deserves to, and will be,
scrapped. The sooner the better.
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with the goals of proportionate sentencing, deterrence, and
uniform sentencing.140 It is asserted that there must be some
reform made in order to conform the use of substantial assistance
departures to the goals of punishment and the objectives of the
Guidelines. The author, to ensure that the use of substantial
assistance departures results in sentences that are more
proportionate and uniform, and are more effective deterrents,
suggests several methods. In order to achieve the goal of uniform
sentencing, it is suggested that uniform guidelines be
implemented throughout the districts setting forth what type of
assistance rises to the level of substantial assistance and the
degree of departure permitted for a certain amount of substantial
assistance. 141 Guidelines pertaining to the degree of departure
will also address proportionality concerns. 142 Finally, limiting the
number of substantial assistance motions prosecutors are
allowed to give will increase the effectiveness of federal
sentencing as a deterrent because defendants will no longer
expect to cooperate and receive a lesser sentence. 143
140 See Richman, supra note 30, at *1 (concluding that any system allowing leniency
in exchange for cooperation threatens sentencing regime based on proportionality; see
also Stiller, supra note 2, at 108 (arguing lack of application principles in Section 5KI. 1
threatens goals of Guidelines); Lewis, supra note 67, at 2 (criticizing substantial
assistance departures); Sentencing Report Airs Equity Problems With 'Substantial
Assistance' Departures, U.S. L. WEEK, Feb. 24, 1998, at 2503 (noting substantial
assistance departures are inconsistent with Guideline goals).
141 See Stiller, supra note 2, at 110 (suggesting method for determining departure);
see also Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *2 (discussing suggestions by scholars
advocating nationwide guidelines to determine whether substantial assistance departures
are warranted). But see Patti B. Saris, Below The Radar Screens: Have The Sentencing
Guidelines Eliminated Disparity? One Judge's Perspective, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1027,
1046 (1997) (indicating absence of and difficulties associated with creation of national
departure guidelines).
142 See generally Stiller, supra note 2, at 110 (suggesting method for determining
extent of substantial assistance departure); John Council, Benchmarks; More Downward
Departures Granted; In Criminal Cases, Federal Judges Stray from Sentencing
Guidelines, TEX. LAW., Nov. 27, 2000, at 24 (discussing factors taken into consideration
for substantial-assistance departures); David E. Rovella, US. Judges' Sentences Dip
Below Guidelines Agency Attributes Trend to Surge in Immigration Cases,- Members of
Congress Call it Abuse of the Rules, N.J. L.J., Nov. 27, 2000 (noting factors determining
departures).
143 See Weinstein, supra note 18, at 629-31 (reasoning that limiting possible motions
prosecutors can make will force prosecutors to use substantial assistance motions more
sparingly and that when amount of cooperation decreases, so will expectation of
cooperation agreements). See generally Prepared Testimony ofKenneth W. Sukhia Before
the House Judiciary Committee Before the Subcommittee on Crime, FED. NEWS SERV.,
Mar. 11, 1999 (discussing federal sentencing as deterrent); Elliot Grossman, Three-Year
Investigation Ends in Drug Indictments; Officials Say They've Broken Up a Sophisticated
Lehigh Valley Cocaine Distribution Ring, THE MORNING CALL, Jul. 9, 1999, at B1 (noting
that arrests should serve as deterrent to drug dealers, partly because of strict federal
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Guidelines for Defining Substantial Assistance
As indicated earlier, there are no uniform federal guidelines
dictating what type of assistance constitutes substantial
assistance. 144 The lack of formal guidelines makes it difficult for
any uniform definition of substantial assistance to be used by
prosecutors.145 The result is that every prosecutor has his or her
own idea about what type of assistance may rise to the level of
substantial assistance, and deserve a Section 5K1.1 motion. 146
The prosecutor may have to follow guidelines devised in his or
her particular district addressing what type of assistance
constitutes substantial assistance; but not all districts have
established such guidelines.147 Furthermore, since there are no
uniform federal standards, there is disparity and disagreement
across the districts as to what constitutes substantial
assistance.148 It is asserted that the creation of uniform federal
sentencing guidelines),
144 See Hearings, supra note 3 (testimony of Sen. Thurmond) (acknowledging vast
disparities in how individual U.S. Attorney's apply Guidelines); Richman, supra note 30,
at *2 (stating that government standards for substantial assistance vary greatly);
Sentencing Report Airs Equity Problems With 'Substantial Assistance' Departures, U.S.
L. WEEK, Feb. 24, 1998, 2503 (discussing difference in federal standards regarding what
constitutes substantial assistance); see also Richnan, supra note 65, at *2-3 (illustrating
how 5K1.1 practices differ across districts by comparing Eastern District of Virginia and
Eastern District of Pennsylvania).
145 See Richman, supra note 65, at *2-3 (discussing varying standards for determining
whether substantial assistance has been provided); see also Stiller, supra note 2, at 109
(arguing granting unfettered discretion to prosecutors in application of Section 5K1.1
results in varying applications of Section 5K1.1 across districts); Court Decisions, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 21, 1998, at 32 (discussing US. v. Harpaul and standard for substantial
assistance).
146 See Stiller, supra note 2, at 109 (discussing how application of Section 5K1.1 is left
in hands of U.S. Attorneys and Assistant U.S. Attorneys); see also Richman, supra note
30, at *4 (suggesting that only attorney who is responsible for case can truly assess
whether cooperator has truly cooperated); Sentences Still Vary; US. Sentencing
Commission, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16, 1998, at A12 (reporting inconsistent definition of
substantial assistance).
147 See Maxfield & Kramer, supra note 87, at *6 (noting as of 1995, 20.2% of U.S.
Attorney's Offices maintained written substantial assistance policy); see also Lee &
Derdowski, supra note 30, at "1 (discussing Commission's finding that 4 out of 5 U.S.
Attorney's Offices maintain written substantial assistance policies); Sentencing Report
Airs Equity Problems With 'Substantial Assistance'Departures U.S. L. W., Feb. 24, 1998,
at 2503 (stating that although 80% of U.S. Attorney's Office have written policies and
review procedures covering substantial assistance U.S. Attorney's Offices often diverge
from these policies).
148 See Richman, supra note 65, at *1 (noting differing government standards for
substantial assistance adds to disparity problem); see also Lee & Derdowski, supra note
30, at *5 (stating disparity results from lack of uniform guidelines to aid prosecutors in
determining whether substantial assistance motion is warranted); Stiller, supra note 2, at
109-10 (discussing how lack of application principles create arbitrariness in 5K.1
practice); Weinstein, supra note 18, at 564 (acknowledging district to district disparities
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standards would ensure that all prosecutors follow the same
notion of what substantial assistance is and would help to
eliminate sentencing disparity throughout the districts.
It is suggested that the guidelines should include a
nonexclusive list of factors to evaluate substantial assistance,
and a nonexclusive list of illustrative examples of substantial
assistance.149 Federal prosecutors should also be required to
make a short summary of the type of information provided to
them by cooperating defendants who received substantial
assistance departures, and the summary should be made
available as precedent.o50 It is asserted that these suggestions
will effectively reduce the amount of confusion and disagreement
over what types of information constitute substantial assistance.
Arguably, by eliminating some of the disagreement surrounding
the definition of substantial assistance and requiring all federal
prosecutors to conform to one definition of substantial assistance,
the federal sentencing scheme will be one step closer to achieving
its goal of uniformity.
Guidelines for Determining the Degree of Departure
As noted previously, commentators have noted there is a lack
of guidance in determining the degree of the departure once a
federal judge has decided that a substantial assistance departure
is warranted.151 The lack of guidelines regarding the degree of
in application of Section 5K1.1 threatens goals of uniformity and elimination of disparity).
149 See Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at * 5 (noting many scholars have suggested
establishing nationwide guidelines to guide prosecutors in determining whether
cooperating defendants have provided substantial assistance); see also Howard Mintz,
The Sentencing Game,- Federal sentencing guidelines were supposed to bring consistency
to punishment and curtail deal making in the justice system. In the Northern District,
the reforms have just made the bargaining more complicated, THE RECORDER, Jul. 7,
1992, at 1 (acknowledging need to clarify definition of substantial assistance); Stiller,
supra note 2, at 109-110 (suggesting the Commission develop and implement application
principles for Section 5KI. 1).
150 See generally Sentencing Report Airs Equity Problems With 'Substantial
Assistance' Departures, U.S. L. WEEK, Feb. 24, 1998, 2503 (suggesting prosecutors be
required to submit statement of reasons for making 5K1.1 motion); Lee, supra note 62, at
129 (noting that Terwillinger Memorandum, issued by Justice Department in 1992,
requires prosecutors to make statement of reasons supporting all filed 5K1.1 motions); see
also Abramowitz, supra note 15, at 3 (citing U.S. v. Harpaul).
151 See Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *7 (stating there are no guidelines to aid
judges in determining extent of departures); see also Stiller, supra note 2, at 108
(discussing lack of guidance exists for application of 5K1.1); Maro Robbins, Drug Plot
Ringleader Gets 8 Years; Contrition, Guilty Plea Draw Lighter Sentence for Former SA.
Policeman, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEWS, Jun. 20, 2002, at 1B (discussing judge's leeway
in deciding punishment).
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departures increases the lack of uniformity and may result in
more disproportionate sentences. 152 The degree of departure
granted to a cooperating defendant is currently determined by an
individual judge, with only the recommendation of the federal
prosecutor as a guideline.153 This method of determining the
degree of departures leaves considerable room for judges to use
their discretion and invariably leads to different levels of
departures for defendants who committed similar crimes and
provided similar assistance. 154 The existence of formal, uniform
guidelines for determining the degree of departure that consider
both the type of assistance provided and the crime the defendant
is charged with will help to ensure that the degree of departures
for similarly situated defendants is more uniform.155 This will
help to increase uniformity and further the goals of the
Guidelines.156 Additionally, the use of formal guidelines for
determining the degree of the departure to be granted will help
to ensure that sentences are proportionate to the crime
152 See Mary Wisniewski Holden, Questions remain after 10 years of sentencing
guidelines, CHI. LAWYER, Dec. 1997, at 8 (commenting on national disparities of
substantial assistance departures); Stiller supra note 2, at 109 (illustrating how lack of
uniformity increases disparity); see also Hearing of the Crime Subcommittee of the House
Judiciary Committee, FED. NEWS SERV., Dec. 15, 1995 (discussing how discretion in
substantial assistance departure is sometimes being employed inconsistently).
153 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. K, cmt 3 (2002) (providing
sentencing judge should give substantial weight to prosecutor's evaluation of defendant's
assistance when determining extent of departure); see also Stiller, supra note 2, at 108
(stating that while judges have sole discretion in determining extent of departure, the
Commission provides substantial weight should be given to prosecutors'
recommendations); Brad Zinn, Waynesboro Man Could Get Life Term, THE DAILY NEWS
LEADER, Nov. 14, 2002, at 3A (noting judge's authority with substantial assistance
departure).
154 See Richman, supra note 65, at *1 (stating that due to the lack of guidance in
determining how cooperators should be treated, two similarly situated cooperators will be
treated differently). See generally Selya & Massaro, supra note 1, at 825 (noting judges
have discretion in determining degree of departure); Prepared Statement of Carmen D.
Hernandez on Behalf of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, FED.
NEWS SERV., Oct. 13, 2000 (finding that mandatory minimum penalties are being
disproportionately applied).
155 See Stiller, supra note 2, at 109 (suggesting Sentencing Commission should
research and establish uniform sentence reduction for substantial assistance departure);
see also Lee, supra note 62, at 178 (suggesting limit on extent of departure judge may
grant); Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *1-3 (noting one suggested cause of
inconsistency is lack of guidance for judges to determine degree of departure).
156 See Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *7 (stating lack of guidance in
determining amount of departure creates inconsistency); see also Richman, supra note 65,
at *1 (discussing how lack of guidelines as to how cooperators should be treated creates
increased disparities); The American College of Trial Lawyers Report and Proposal on
Section 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 66, at 1504 (noting
that inequitable application of Section 5K1.1 compromises efficacy of the Sentence
Guidelines as a whole).
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committed while still taking into consideration the Congressional
mandate that stated cooperation should be rewarded in the
sentencing process.157 The guidelines could limit the degree of
departure permitted based on the seriousness of the crime
committed and/or the defendant's criminal history. This scheme
would be more consistent with the overall purposes of the
Guidelines and traditional goals of punishment. 158
It is suggested that the degree of the departure should be
subject to the consideration of several factors that are uniform
throughout the districts. 59 As noted above, these guidelines
would help to ensure that the degrees of departures are uniform
for similarly situated defendants throughout the districts.160
These considerations should include the seriousness of the
offense the cooperating defendant is charged with and the
cooperating defendant's criminal history. If a cooperating
defendant has committed a serious crime or is a repeat offender,
the possible departure should be limited in some way.161 This
157 See Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *7 (suggesting judges should not depart to
the same extent for defendants of varying culpabilities merely because defendants
provided similar assistance); ef Lee, supra note 62, at 128 (stating that sliding scale
limits on departures would adequately address concerns about fairness to individual
concerns). See generally The American College of Trial Lawyers Report and Proposal on
Section 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 66, at 1524-35
(discussing proposed revision of Section 5K1.1 aimed in part at remedying the
proportionality problems inhering in the present system).
158 See Stiller, supra note 2, at 110 (stating uniform methods of determining extent of
departures would cure problems associated with Section 5K1. 1); cf. The American College
of Trial Lawyers Report and Proposal on Section 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, supra note 66, at 1531 (describing proposal which, also in an effort to serve
the overall objectives of the Guidelines, would seek to narrow the variance in granted
departures by delineating specific factors to assist courts in making their determination);
see also Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *9 (considering argument that binding plea
agreements might reduce inconsistencies but concluding that some inconsistency may be
warranted and that up-front plea agreements would not be a panacea).
159 See The American College of Trial Lawyers Report and Proposal on Section 5K1.1
of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 156, at 1531 (arguing that
unwarranted disparities in magnitude of departures would be significantly reduced if the
court had specific factors to consider); cf Lee, supra note 62, at 172 (discussing guidelines'
provision that particular factors previously used by sentencing judge should not be used
as a basis for departure); Stiller, supra note 2, at 110 (discussing method of determining
extent of departures, whereby most defendants receiving substantial assistance
departures would be granted a presumptive discount, referred to as "the heartland of
substantial assistance").
160 See Stiller, supra note 2, at 110 (suggesting a system of uniform departures would
cure problems associated with Section 5Kl.1); see also Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at
*7 (discussing need for some guidance as to how to determine extent of departures);
Proposal, supra note 156, at 1523-24 (commenting that disparity of departure rates
among district courts is attributable to lack of guidance given to judges).
161 See generally, Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *7 (noting judges should not be
forced to grant similar departures for defendants of different culpabilities); see also Lee,
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provision will ensure that serious, repeat offenders do not receive
minimal sentences. 162 Taking the defendant's culpability into
account when determining the degree of the departure helps to
achieve the goal of proportionate sentencing while remaining
consistent with the Congressional mandate that cooperation
should be rewarded. 163
Limiting the Number of Substantial Assistance Motions Made
Limiting the number of substantial assistance motions made
by federal prosecutors will help to alleviate many perceived
problems with substantial assistance departures, some not
addressed in this note. 164 It is asserted limiting the amount of
substantial assistance motions will help to increase the
effectiveness of the Guidelines as a deterrent. As noted earlier,
many commentators have argued that the use of substantial
assistance departures sends criminals the wrong message and
therefore does not act as an effective deterrent. 165 If the numbers
of substantial assistance motions are limited, prosecutors will not
supra note 62, at 178-79 (suggesting extent of all departures should be limited according
to sliding scale to address fairness concerns); cf Galin, supra note 87, at 1251 (2000)
(describing guidelines' sentencing mechanics which already contemplate these factors by
using a graph system which measures along one axis the severity of the crime and along
the other axis the offender's criminal history).
162 See Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *7 (suggesting more culpable defendants
should receive smaller departures); see also Lee, supra note 62, at 179 (noting extent of
departures should vary slightly based on fairness to individual concerns); The American
College of Trial Lawyers Report and Proposal on Section 5K1.1 of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 66, at 1530 (discussing proposed revision of 5K1.1
which would direct a court to consider the relative culpability of defendant and party
being prosecuted or investigated when contemplating degree of departure).
163 See Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *7 (suggesting culpability be taken into
account when determining extent of departures); see also Lee, supra note 62, at 179
(discussing reasons that warrant variation in extent of departure); cf The American
College of Trial Lawyers Report and Proposal on Section 5K1.1 of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 66, at 1530 (offering remedy to "cooperation paradox"
by proposing that courts be permitted to aggregate assistance of several defendants when
measuring assistance of any single defendant).
164 See Weinstein, supra note 18, at 630-32 (discussing benefits to limiting number of
substantial assistance departure motions); see also Ellen Yaroshefsky, supra note 113, at
963 (recognizing Weinstein's proposal). But see George C. Harris, supra note 112, at 34
(commenting that Weinstein does not explain how this limit would be monitored or
enforced).
165 See Chambers, supra note 18, at 13, col. 1 (suggesting use of substantial
assistance departures send criminals the wrong message); see also Fried, supra note 77,
at sec. A, p. 1, col. 1 (quoting attorney Gerald B. Lefcourt, "[I]t creates the informer
system, whereby if you please the Government, you go free"); Lee, supra note 62, at 172
(commenting that most defendants will continue to cooperate regardless of prosecutorial
arbitrariness because it is one of the only ways defendants can receive a lower sentence).
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be so willing to incite defendants to cooperate with the promise of
a motion when the defendant's cooperation is not an utter
necessity.166 Prosecutors will use the motions sparingly for fear
that they will need one later on to obtain vital information from a
defendant and have already used up their allotted amount. 167
Defendants are less likely to assume they will be able to receive a
lesser sentence in exchange for information if the number of
substantial assistance motions are limited and used by
prosecutors only as a last resort.168 Since defendants are less
likely to expect a lesser sentence in exchange for cooperation, and
rather expect a harsh sentence, they are more likely to refrain
from committing crimes. ' 69
It is suggested that each federal prosecutor be limited to a
certain number of substantial assistance motions for a period of
time. 170 The number of motions permitted and the period of time
should be determined by researching the current substantial
166 See Weinstein, supra note 18, at 630 (stating limiting amount of substantial
assistance departure motions would force prosecutors to make better use of their
discretion in selecting cooperators); see also Lee, supra note 62, at 109 (commenting that
the government motion requirement of section 5K1. 1 gives prosecutors ultimate authority
to decide if defendants will receive a departure); Galin, supra note 99, at 1277 (arguing
that enticing a defendant to cooperate with a downward departure motion, only to deny
such a motion by exploiting a subjective condition in the contract, compromises
government's integrity).
167 See Weinstein, supra note 18, at 630-31 (arguing prosecutors weigh decisions to
use cooperation against other possible instances of cooperation). But see, Lee, supra note
62, at 108 (focusing critique not on the overuse of departures, but instead on problematic
autonomy of prosecutors in opting not to offer a departure in any given case). See
generally The American College of Trial Lawyers Report and Proposal on Section 5K1. 1 of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 66, at 1528 (reporting survey results
of those who believe Section 5K1.1 vests too much discretion in hands of prosecutor).
168 See Weinstein, supra note 18, at 629-30 (stating that by reducing incentives to
cooperate, cooperation would in fact decrease); cf Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1506 n.111 (1993) ("Substantial
assistance is part of the larger context of sales of information, and such sales have always
been consensual"). See generally U.S. v. Marino, 983 F.2d 1150 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating
that Section 5K1.1 provides defendants an incentive to cooperate in the administration of
justice).
169 See U.S. v. Smith, 909 F.2d 1164, 1168 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating there is a
deterrence value in a longer sentence); see also U.S. v. Turner, 998 F.2d 534, 536 (7th Cir.
1993) (noting sentences should deter criminal conduct). See generally Cotton, supra note
49, at 1315 (stating deterrence theories focus on threat of punishment to prevent people
from engaging in criminal conduct).
170 Cf Samuel A. Perroni & Mona J. McNutt, Criminal Contingency Fee Agreements:
How Fair Are They, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 211, 231 (1994) (stating how "the
prosecution could be allowed to offer any two concessions in exchange for cooperation and
testimony, but no more"); Weinstein, supra note 18, at 630 (suggesting number of
substantial assistance motions be limited by district). See generally Podgor, supra note
116, at 798-99 (criticizing the inconsistent application of assistance motions).
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assistance practices within the district.171 Additionally, some
provisions should be made, by which, if there is a vital need for a
prosecutor to grant a substantial assistance motion and he or she
has already used all of his or her allotted motions, the prosecutor
would be permitted to make the motion. 172 However, use of a
provision such as the one described should only be used as a last
resort in an extreme case.
CONCLUSION
The substantial assistance departure provided for in Section
5K1.1 of the Guidelines has been the subject of much
controversy.173 The use of such departures impedes various goals
of the Guidelines and traditional sentencing goals.174 Substantial
assistance departures increase disparity in sentencing, impede
deterrence objectives, and create disproportionate sentences.175
Despite the problems with the use of substantial assistance
departures, they serve a greater need.' 76 The use of substantial
171 See Weinstein, supra note 18, at 630 (suggesting limit of substantial assistance
departure should be 15% of cases); see also Perroni & McNutt, supra note 170 (proposing
that in plea agreements the prosecution be allotted two concessions for cooperation and
testimony). See generally Nora V. Demleitner, Immigration Threats And Rewards:
Effective Law Enforcement Tools In The "War" On Terrorism, 51 EMoRY L.J. 1059, 1086-
87 (2002) (comparing local diversity in Utah, where 0.5% of offenders had departures
based on assistance motions, with 40.5% in the Central District of Illinois).
172 See Ronald S. Safer & Matthew C. Crowl, Substantial Assistance Departures
Valuable Tool or Dangerous Weapon? 12 FED. SENT. R. 41, available at 1999 WL
1458621, at *6 (noting prosecutors need flexibility in making substantial assistance
motions). See generally Gowdy, supra note 1, at 474-75 (emphasizing need for substantial
assistance departures to aid law enforcement); Arkin, supra note 46, at p. 3, col. 1 (noting
necessity of cooperation to law enforcement is well established).
173 See e.g, Abramowitz, supra note 15, at p. 3, col. 1 (discussing problems with
Section 5Kl.1); Lewis, supra note 67, at 2 (criticizing use of substantial assistance
departures); Stiller, supra note 2, at 107 (criticizing lack of application principles for
5K1.1 practice).
174 See Stiller, supra note 2, at 107 (stating lack of application principles for
substantial assistance departures circumvent goals of Guidelines); see also Richman,
supra note 30, at *4 (noting substantial assistance departures threaten sentencing goals).
But see J. Stephen Breyer, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, 11 FED. SENT. R.
180 available at 1999 WL 730985, *1 (Vera Inst.Just.) (1999) (discussing how the
guideline's objectives were reached).
175 See Richman, supra note 30, at *1-3 (discussing various problems with use of
substantial assistance departures); see also Lewis, supra note 67, at 2 (noting problems
with use of cooperation encouraged by Guidelines). But see J. Breyer, supra note 174
(arguing that although "the guideline system is far from perfect" it is not deserving of its
current criticisms).
176 See Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *4 (concluding that while substantial
assistance departures have their drawbacks the benefits outweigh the costs); see also
Richman, supra note 30, at *1-3 (noting substantial assistance departures may be the
only way in which to obtain critical information). But see Lewis, supra note 67, at 2
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assistance departures creates incentives for defendants to work
with the government by providing information and testimony.177
The assistance cooperating defendants supply help to arrest and
convict many serious offenders. 178 Arguably many of these
offenders would not be arrested or convicted if not for the use of
substantial assistance departures, because without the promise
of a lesser sentence many defendants would choose to remain
silent. Additionally, substantial assistance departures provide
the possibility of a decreased sentence to defendants, who face
severely harsh penalties under mandatory minimum sentencing
laws.
Given the enormous benefits of substantial assistance
departures, they appear to be here to stay, however, given the
problems with such departures there is need for reform. There
are many suggestions as to how Section 5K1.1 can be reformed
thereby ensuring that the use of substantial assistance
departures yield results consistent with the goals of sentencing
and the goals of the Guidelines. Some of the various ways
Section 5K1.1 can be reformed is limiting the number of
substantial assistance motions made by federal prosecutors,179
including a comprehensive, uniform definition of substantial
assistance,18 0 and creating guidelines to determine the degree of
(arguing substantial assistance departures are more costly than beneficial and therefore
should be eliminated).
177 See Richman, supra note 30, at *4 (discussing need for inducements to obtain
information from criminals); see also Arkin, supra note 46, at p.3, col. 1 (suggesting
substantial assistance departures create incentives to cooperate); Chambers, supra note
18, at p.13, col. 1 (noting arguments made by former U.S. Attorney that without
recognition criminals will not be induced into cooperating).
178 See Gowdy, supra note 1, at 474-475 (discussing how information bought with
leniency aids law enforcement); see also Limbert, supra note 1, at 251 (stating cooperation
is essential to law enforcement); Richman, supra note 30, at *4 (noting cooperator
testimony is essential to prosecutions).
179 See Weinstein, supra note 18, at 630 (suggesting placing limits on number of
substantial assistance departures that are permitted will alleviate problems associated
with use of these departures); see also Scott A. Gilbert & Molly T. Johnson, The Federal
Judicial Center's 1996 Survey Of Guideline Experience, 9 FED. SENT. R. 87, available at
1996 WL 931748, at *4 (reporting that 5% of district judge's and chief probation officer's
polled with open-ended survey questions wanted, as their one change to the guidelines, to
reduce prosecutor's discretion). See generally Michael Tonry, GAO Report Confirms
Failure Of U.S. Guidelines, 5 FED. SENT. R. 144, available at 1992 WL 439717, at *7-8
(questioning whether the Guidelines shifted too much power to prosecutors).
180 John Scalia, The Impact Of Changes In Federal Law And Policy On The
Sentencing Of, And Time Served In Prison By, Drug Defendants Convicted In US.
District Courts, 14 FED. SENT. R. 152, available at 2002 WL 31308054, at *4 (stating how
"the U.S. Sentencing Commission reported that substantial assistance was not
consistently defined across judicial districts"); see also Susan Katzenelson & Pamela
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departure. 81
Montgomery, Report To The US. Sentencing Commission By Its Substantial Assistance
Staff Working Group, 11 FED. SENT. R. 18, available at 1998 WL 911927, at *12
(identifying probation officer concerns that prosecutors apply varying standards as to
what constitutes substantial assistance). See generally Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30,
*1-7 (discussing recommendations of establishing nationwide guidelines defining
substantial assistance).
181 See Stiller, supra note 2, at 107 (suggesting guidelines for determining degrees of
departures); see also Lee & Derdowski, supra note 30, at *4 (discussing methods of
bringing consistency to the magnitude of substantial assistance departures). See
generally Avern Cohn, Advice To The Commission - A Sentencer's View, 8 FED. SENT. R.
14, available at 1995 WL 803971, at *2 (giving three suggestions to alleviate guideline
disparities).
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